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STRANGER THAN FICTION: AN “INSIDE” LOOK 
AT ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY AND DEFENSE 
STRATEGY IN THE DEEPWATER HORIZON 
AFTERMATH 
William H. Rodgers, Jr., Jason DeRosa & Sarah Reyneveld* 
Abstract: The Deepwater Horizon oil spill of April 20, 2010 initiated an 
environmental disaster that presented attorneys on both sides of the legal action 
with monumental challenges. Using the satirical format of a memo written by 
the corporate defense counsel to BP America four days after the spill began, this 
article investigates BP’s potential liability and strategic defense positions 
available in criminal and civil proceedings. Major federal environmental laws, 
including the Oil Pollution Act, the Clean Water Act and major wildlife 
protection statutes, are implicated by the Spill. The memo provides a clear 
picture of the existing opportunities for a responsible party to minimize liability 
in the face of incriminating evidence.  This article argues that the successful use 
of legal precedents, tactical defenses and the enhanced role of the responsible 
party in response and restoration, will minimize BP America’s liability and civil 
and criminal penalties resulting from the Spill, to the detriment of the 
prevention of future environmental crimes. 
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Author’s Note: This is a completely fictional Memorandum of 
Law from BP Counsel to their clients on Day Four of the 
Macondo Well Oil Spill (April 24, 2010). That is, future events 
have not unfolded and must be predicted or imagined. The 
citations are not fictional. 
 
Date: April 24, 2010 
To: BP America, Inc. 
From: Bendini, Lambert & Locke, Attorneys at Law1 
Re: Initial Memorandum of Law Discussing  
  Representation of BP on Matters Pertaining to  
  the Deepwater Horizon Oil Well Blowout 
I. INTRODUCTION 
As the lawyers for BP America (BP), this is our initial 
strategy memorandum discussing how we intend to address 
your company’s liability stemming from the sudden misfortune 
at your Macondo Well on April 20 of this year. 
We must assure BP that in the post-Exxon Valdez Spill era, 
the U.S. system of environmental law is formidable and 
                                                
* Professor William H. Rodgers is the Stimson Bullitt Professor of Law at the 
University of Washington School of Law. Jason DeRosa and Sarah Reyneveld are 2011 
graduates of the University of Washington School of Law. Appreciation is expressed 
for the research and ideas of the students in the class of LAW B565 U.S. Coastal & 
Ocean Law, University of Washington, School of Law, Autumn 2010: Jeffrey Barnum, 
Peter C. Boome, Amanda Cardenas, Chih Chen, Angela Cook, Wyatt Golding, Joyce 
Heinan, Sarah Jordan, Jason Kovacs, Sara Leverette, Kenny Wei, Brooke Williams, 
Taylor Wonhoff, Xi Yang. 
 1. Bendini, Lambert & Locke is a fictional law firm featured in the John Grisham 
book and movie, The Firm. See Michael Asimow, Embodiment of Evil: Law Firms in 
the Movies, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1339, 1353 (2001). 
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punitive, and BP’s potential liabilities are significant and vast. 
The system, however, is complex and full of legal defenses that 
our team is ready to exploit. BP faces risk on five legal fronts: 
criminal liability, civil penalties payable to the United States, 
civil damages owed to private parties, response costs and 
natural resource damages payable to the United States, the 
affected States and possibly Indian tribes. 
The Gulf Oil Spill2 caused ecological devastation, fatalities 
and significant economic loss to the Gulf coast. The case for 
criminal prosecution rests on the fact that the unprecedented 
damage caused by the disaster and the loss of eleven lives 
might have been avoided if BP had adhered to safety 
standards and a standard of care greater than that shown in 
the lead-up to the disaster. The spill caused catastrophic 
ecological devastation and BP is likely liable for violating 
wildlife statutes because of the harm and death of thousands of 
birds, sea turtles, marine mammals and fish. The culpability 
standard and our available defenses vary depending on the 
wildlife (birds, mammals, or endangered species) harmed. 
BP is also vulnerable to criminal liability under the Clean 
Water Act (CWA) if there is any evidence of corner cutting, 
measured safety risks and deviation from industry standards. 
If the Department of Justice (DOJ) commences a suit, BP will 
be charged with violations of the Clean Water Act (CWA) for 
negligently discharging into navigable waters. If the DOJ can 
prove that the discharge occurred knowingly, BP will also be 
charged with a violation of the “knowing endangerment” 
provision of the CWA.3 Further, ten or fifteen of your top 
executives and decision-makers (“responsible corporate 
officers”) could be charged with offenses resulting in actual 
prison sentences for the felony of criminal endangerment. 
While it is within the realm of possibility, the likelihood that 
individual BP executives will be prosecuted is slim. 
Finally, BP should assume that the Department of Justice 
(DOJ) is investigating the “debarment option,” which could 
eliminate BP’s current and future contracts with the American 
government and military.4 BP’s history of cost-cutting 
                                                
2. Though most people will call this the “BP Oil Spill” we urge you to use the term 
“Gulf Oil Spill.” 
 3. 33 U.S.C § 1319(c)(2) (2006). 
4. E.g., id. § 1368(a) (prohibiting federal contracting with any person under the 
Clean Water Act “until the Administrator certifies that the condition giving rise to 
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measures have led to three earlier criminal convictions—for 
activities in Endicott Bay, Texas City and Prudhoe Bay—
which could be considered in weighing the more serious 
debarment option.5 The sheer size and importance of BP to 
America’s economic and security interest will likely prevent 
these accumulated resentments from resulting in complete 
debarment. 
BP’s negligence authorizes DOJ to seek hefty civil penalties 
under the CWA. The Act’s civil penalty provision will likely 
impose significant financial burdens for BP. The clear risk 
under the CWA is a civil fine of $1,110 per barrel of oil spilled 
and $4,300 per barrel if the company is proven to be grossly 
negligent.6 Based on your early estimate that the Macondo 
Well is leaking five thousand barrels per day, civil penalties 
could reach $21.5 million per day. If the spill continues for 100 
days, or if your estimate is low by a factor of 100, the fine is 
$2.15 billion; if both, the fine is $21.5 billion.7 Our firm will 
need to work closely with BP on this highly sensitive topic and 
must have a confidential discussion on the actual rate of flow 
and your methods for calculating it. Because the law uses 
                                                
such conviction has been corrected”). The federal government continues to award 
contracts to BP. See Contracts for Thursday, May 12, 2011, Department of Defense, 
http://www.defense.gov/contracts/contract.aspx?contractid=4533 (last visited Dec. 2, 
2011) (indicating that BP was awarded a Department of Defense contract in May 
2011). 
5. See Abraham Lustgarten, Furious Growth and Cost Cuts Led to BP Accidents Past 
and Present, PROPUBLICA (Oct. 26, 2010, 10:32 AM), 
http://www.propublica.org/article/bp-accidents-past-and-present (discussing, generally, 
debarment and the various problems that led to investigation). 
6. See 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(7)(D) (2006); 26 U.S.C. § 9509 (2006) (stating that any 
discharge of oil that is a result of gross negligence of any owner or operator will toll 
toward the negligent party at a maximum of $3,000); see also Civil Monetary Penalty 
Inflation Adjustment Rule, 60 Fed. Reg. 30, 7121, 7124 (Feb. 13, 2004) (codified at 40 
C.F.R. pts. 19, 27) (stating that the §1321 civil penalty for oil discharge will have a 
new maximum violation amount of $4,300 per barrel). 
7. See NATIONAL INCIDENT COMMAND, INTERAGENCY SOLUTIONS GROUP, FLOW RATE 
TECHNICAL GROUP, ASSESSMENT OF FLOW RATE ESTIMATES FOR THE DEEPWATER 
HORIZON / MACONDO WELL OIL SPILL 1–2 (2011). Three days after a capping stack was 
installed on the well on July 12, 2010, the choke valve was closed and oil stopped 
flowing into the Gulf. Three different teams from Department of Energy (DOE) labs 
used pressure measurements recorded as the valve was closed to yield the most precise 
and accurate estimation of flow from the Macondo well: 53,000 barrels/day at the time 
just prior to shut in.; see also WILLIAM R. FREUDENBURG & ROBERT GRAMLING, 
BLOWOUT IN THE GULF: THE BP OIL SPILL DISASTER AND THE FUTURE OF ENERGY IN 
AMERICA 13 (MIT Press 2011) (stating BP’s initial estimates were two percent of 
actual volume). 
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various techniques for measuring and estimating flow, our 
firm must learn from BP about the fine distinctions between 
actual flow, measured flow, perceived flow and disguised flow. 
The law will permit any techniques for measuring and 
estimating flow that passes its gatekeeping test.8 The ongoing 
flow from the Macondo Well represents a hemorrhaging of BP’s 
financial resources. 
All strategy and planning will be measured by reference to 
the 1989 spill of the Exxon Valdez, where a tanker collided 
with Bligh Reef and let loose eleven million gallons of North 
Slope crude oil into Prince William Sound. This oil spill has 
every prospect of surpassing Exxon Valdez in geography 
affected, amounts spilled, duration, impacts and legal and 
political retaliation.9 
Civil damages, for matters such as lost profits for the Gulf 
tourism industry, curtailed fishing, lost tourism and 
destruction of personal livelihood, are potentially vast. BP 
should recognize, however, that the entire fury of the U.S. 
personal injury and class action bar limped home in the Exxon 
Valdez spill case with damages around $500 million. Double 
that to account for the punitive damages, and the entire bill 
came to rest at a figure of perhaps one billion dollars.10 BP’s 
civil liability damages, for reasons of time of year (fishing and 
spawning seasons) and adjacency of the spill to heavy 
commercial and recreational activity, will be many times more 
extravagant than those suffered by Exxon—we will start with 
fifteen billion dollars as an early estimate. Our firm has 
developed several strategies for limiting this loss, explained in 
                                                
8. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579, 592–95 (1993) 
(identifying the following four nonexclusive factors that contribute to judicial decisions 
on admissibility of scientific methodologies such as measuring flow rate: (1) whether 
the technique has been subjected to peer review or publications, (2) the “known or 
potential rate of error,” (3) a “reliability assessment,” in which the “degree of 
acceptance” within a scientific community may be determined, and (4) the “testability” 
of the technique). 
9. Compare THE SPILL: PERSONAL STORIES FROM THE EXXON VALDEZ DISASTER 19–
21 (Sharon Bushell & Stan Jones eds., Epicenter Press 2009) [hereinafter 2009 
PERSONAL STORIES] with FREUDENBURG & GRAMLING, supra note 7, at 11–13 and 
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL AND OFFSHORE OIL 
DRILLING, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 129–71 (2011) [hereinafter 2011 NATIONAL 
COMMISSION REPORT]. 
10. See Exxon Shipping v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 515 (2008) (holding $507.5 million in 
compensatory damages reasonable and 1:1 ratio of compensatory-to-punitive damages 
as the maximum punitive damage award). 
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Part III of this memo, that may ensure economic harms to the 
BP Corporation will be kept within reason. 
In this respect, we recommend a national publicity 
campaign that duplicates the strategy successfully mounted by 
Exxon more than twenty years ago. You must pledge, in 
various open letters to the public, to pay all “legitimate claims” 
and to make everybody “whole.”11 These pledges aim to build 
up public confidence and good will toward BP; we will strive to 
pay all legitimate claims. Additionally, Exxon’s success in 
curtailing punitive damages in U.S. maritime law is of direct 
legal benefit to BP in the Gulf. BP may recall that a federal 
jury returned a five billion dollar verdict against Exxon for 
punitive damages arising out of the 1989 spill.12 Some fourteen 
years later the U.S. Supreme Court overturned this 
judgment.13 
As you know, total liability under the Oil Pollution Act 
(OPA) shall not exceed “the total of all removal costs plus 
$75,000,000.”14 These limits on liability can be overcome if the 
incident was “proximately caused by” gross negligence or 
willful misconduct or by “the violation of an applicable Federal 
safety, construction, or operating regulation.”15 BP is clearly on 
the hook for “all removal costs plus $75,000,000” and might be 
potentially responsible for liabilities beyond that upon a 
showing of “gross negligence” and “willful misconduct.”16 
We applaud BP’s initial response to this matter—declaring 
that any caps or limits are “not relevant” to your calculations.17 
                                                
11. Compare Press Release, BP America Inc., BP Pledges Collateral for Gulf of 
Mexico Oil Spill Trust, (Oct. 10, 2010),  http://www.bp.com/genericarticle.do 
?categoryId=2012968&contentId=7065280 with Jane Eisemann, Kodiak Resident, in 
2009 PERSONAL STORIES, supra note 9, at 183  (“we will make you whole”). 
12. Exxon Shipping, 554 U.S. at 480 (referencing jury award). 
13. Id. 
14. 33 U.S.C. § 2704(a)(3) (2006). 
15. Id. § 2704(c)(1)(A), (B). 
16. See 2011 NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 9, at 217-47 (explaining 
that much of the fault leading up to the disaster is the result of systemic problems in 
government oversight and industry/institutional culture, but also that BP’s “safety 
culture” had failed).  See also 33 U.S.C. § 2704(a)(3) (2006). 
17. See White House: Lift Liability Cap for Gulf Oil Spill, CBS (Mar. 25, 2010), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/05/04/politics/main6460911.shtml (“Asked 
whether the company expected to spend money beyond the $75 million limit, Hayward 
said the cap was largely irrelevant. It’s got nothing to do with caps. All legitimate 
claims will be honored.” ); see also Shaila Dewan, Officials Ask BP to Assure It Will 
Cover Spill Claims, N.Y. TIMES (May 16, 2010), 
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BP limited the amount of public information regarding its 
views on liability, but we have room to fill in the details. BP’s 
position can be charitably characterized as declining to exploit 
legal technicalities that tilt in the company’s direction. 
The best way to control BP’s “response costs” is to manage 
them adroitly and as cheaply as possible. BP took important 
steps in this direction by hiring work crews and sinking, 
burning or burying the oil and debris.18 The more oil BP loses 
at sea, the less the company must bring ashore for what is 
likely an expensive disposal of “hazardous waste.”19 Similarly, 
in Part II, we demonstrate how to position BP within the 
multi-agency process measuring the spill’s impact on nature 
known as the natural resource damage assessment. We 
emphasize minimizing interim resources losses—the lost value 
of natural resources tolling between the spill and restoration—
will help BP’s bottom line. This can be accomplished if we can 
start restoration projects as quickly as possible, regardless of 
how successful they might be. Moving through the “science” 
phase of the natural resource damage assessment process 
rapidly is in BP’s best interest. Let us turn to the particulars of 
the five-front legal war BP is confronted with and our 
preliminary recommendations on how to proceed. 
II.  THE EXXON VALDEZ SPILL AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 
FOR THE BP DEFENSE 
The 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill was brilliantly defended by 
Exxon. That experience created a useful collection of legal 
precedents and tactical advice for BP to employ in the current 
crisis. Exxon functionally escaped from any and all criminal 
sanctions20—a feat BP would be fortunate to replicate. Exxon 
                                                
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/16/us/16spill.html ($75 million cap “irrelevant.”). 
18. CARL SAFINA, A SEA IN FLAMES:  THE DEEPWATER HORIZON BLOWOUT, PART II 
(Random House 2011) (“A Season of Anguish”). 
19. See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL AND 
OFFSHORE DRILLING, CHIEF COUNSEL’S REPORT, MACONDO:  THE GULF OIL DISASTER 
151 (2011) (footnotes omitted) (“Rather, according to internal BP emails and the 
testimony of various witnesses, BP chose to use the lost circulation [materials] as a 
spacer in order to avoid having to dispose of the material as hazardous waste pursuant 
to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA).”). 
20. See William H. Rodgers, Jr. et al., The Exxon Valdez Reopener: Natural 
Resources Damage Settlements and Roads Not Taken, 22 ALASKA. L. REV. 135, 149–51 
(2005) [hereinafter The Exxon Valdez Reopener] (fines assessed are “remitted”). 
7
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shattered the ambitions of the civil lawyers by destroying the 
cultural and subsistence claims of the one group enjoying 
widespread public support—Alaska natives21—and by 
undermining the natural resource claims of sport fishing 
interests, a group endowed with impressive political capital.22 
Exxon also inflicted irreparable damage to the U.S. jury 
system by the creative expedient of secretly “buying” a share of 
the “punitive damages” that was owned by the so-called 
Seattle Seven fishing companies.23 This was done at 
substantial discount and inflicted disarray on the united front 
of the opposition. Further, it created a valuable example of the 
use of corporate buying power that can be invoked to 
undermine juries.24 
Exxon’s success in curtailing punitive damages in U.S. 
maritime law creates a direct legal benefit for BP in the Gulf 
spill. BP may recall that a federal jury returned a five billion 
dollar verdict against Exxon for punitive damages arising out 
of the Exxon Valdez spill.25  In hard-fought litigation, up and 
down in the courts, this $5 billion judgment became $4 billion, 
then $4.5 billion, then $2.5 billion26 and eventually $.5 billion 
in the U.S. Supreme Court.27 In 2008, nineteen years after the 
initial spill, the U.S. Supreme Court overturned the $5 billion 
verdict28 and completely dashed the financial expectations and 
staying power of 32,000 out-of-work fishermen.29 The “rule” of 
the case, for reasons of fairness to Exxon and the potential for 
odious overreaching by the common people of the jury, is that 
                                                
21. Id. at 144. See also Alaska Native Class v. Exxon Corp., 104 F.3d 1196 (9th Cir. 
1997) (explaining that Alaska Native “subsistence lifestyle” claims arising out of the 
spill are not a special injury for purposes of a public nuisance action). 
22. Id. at 180–81. See also Alaska Sport Fishing Ass’n v. Exxon Corp., 34 F.3d 769, 
771–73 (9th Cir. 1994). 
23. The Exxon Valdez Reopener, supra note 20, at 186–87. 
24. Id. 
25. In Re The Exxon Valdez, 472 F.3d 600, 602 (9th Cir. 2006). 
26. See id (explaining the different awards entered in the case). 
27. See Exxon Shipping v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 515 (2008) (adopting the District 
Court’s calculation of total relevant compensatory damages). 
28. See id. 
29. Twenty-six thousand lived to see the ruling. Compare RIKI OTT, NOT ONE DROP: 
BETRAYAL AND COURAGE IN THE WAKE OF THE EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILL, epilogue 
(Chelsea Green Pub. 2008) (discussing the “shock” of hearing about the Supreme Court 
decision) with 2009 PERSONAL STORIES, supra note 9, at 258–59 (quoting Dennis 
Kragin, a Kodiak Fisherman, “I used to say, ‘Exxon is going to pay us. We’ll get paid, 
we’ll get paid.’ . . . I’ll believe it when I see it.”). 
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punitive damages should not exceed the actual damages 
suffered by the fishermen. That is, the case set forth a one-to-
one ratio for punitive and actual damages.30 
This one-to-one ratio rule can be of considerable future 
benefit to BP if the case moves in the direction of punitive 
damages, which is likely.31 For reasons that entirely escape our 
firm, damages to natural resources do not figure in the ratio 
calculations for determining punitive damages. Thus the one 
billion dollars Exxon committed for natural resource damages 
compensation did not earn one penny in punitive damages. 
(Let us assume that the beaches do not care that they were 
heavily oiled and the soiled birds are entirely indifferent to the 
prospects of vengeance). Thus, this one-to-one precedent is 
tantalizingly benign to our future legal prospects and we are 
happy to have it. 
On the natural resource damages front, Exxon arguably 
outgunned the natural resource “trustees”—the sobriquet 
extended to the United States and the State of Alaska. Out of 
the one billion dollar settlement for natural resources 
damages, $900 million was distributed over time to the Exxon 
Valdez Trustee Council.32 In a novel move, Exxon deferred 
payment of $100 million of these funds under a seemingly 
“harmless” reopener provision.33 The “trustees” struggled to 
meet a fifteen-year deadline to seek additional damages by 
June 1, 2006. The hastily framed “demand” that was developed 
was never paid or pursued; Exxon successfully stonewalled the 
whole affair.34 This bold corporate display of determination 
and conviction bought several more years of legal paralysis.35 
Right now, important legal and scientific elements of the 
natural resource damages remain entirely unresolved, well 
past the twenty-first anniversary of the Exxon Valdez oil spill. 
Time is on our side, and the Exxon experience underscores the 
                                                
30. See Exxon Shipping v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 512–513 (2008) (stating that a 1:1 
ratio is a “fair upper limit in maritime cases.”). 
31. Id. 
32. The Exxon Valdez Reopener, supra note 20, at 135. 
33. Id. at 138–39. 
34. See generally William Yardley, 22 Years Later, the Exxon Valdez Case is Back in 
Court, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 3, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/04/us/04 
exxon.html. 
35. Def.’s Mot. to Enforce Consent Decree, United States v. Exxon Corp., No. 3:91-sv-
0082 Civil (HRH) (D.Alaska, Aug. 9, 2011) (an affirmative ruling here would bring an 
end to the “reopener”). 
9
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legal arsenal that can be put to the ready service of extended 
delay. Though we cannot bet on the reliable bungling of our 
adversaries, we are ready to exploit these opportunities if the 
occasion arises. Based on this approach, we recommend the 
following defenses addressing the five legal categories BP will 
likely confront. 
III. RECOMMENDED DEFENSES IN THE FIVE MAJOR 
CATEGORIES 
A. BP’s Criminal Liability 
The Gulf Oil Spill has been called America’s “worst 
environmental disaster.”36 If the Department of Justice (DOJ) 
brings criminal charges against BP, the charges will likely 
allege violations of several wildlife statutes, which are 
misdemeanors, and violations of the Clean Water Act (CWA), 
which may be more severe. The DOJ will likely charge BP with 
violations of the CWA for negligently and/or knowingly 
discharging into navigable waters. The DOJ may charge BP’s 
executives with criminal fraud based on evidence that they 
exaggerated the company’s cleanup capacity and the time 
needed for spilled oil to reach the shore. Additionally, BP may 
be charged with violating the Seaman’s Manslaughter 
Statute,37 which provides felony sanctions for a vessel owner 
whose negligence causes the death of a worker on board the 
vessel. BP’s potential criminal liability, applicable defenses 
and our recommendations follow. 
1. The Wildlife Statutes 
As BP knows, the Gulf is home to an array of sensitive and 
valuable species, many of which have been adversely affected 
by the current spill. The U.S. government has three applicable 
statutes aimed at protecting these species, which may create 
some liability for BP.  First, if the DOJ commences a criminal 
suit, BP will likely be liable for violating the Migratory Bird 
                                                
36. See 2011 NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT , supra note 9,  at 173 (quoting 
President Obama, Oval Office Speech of June 15, 2010); see also Jerry Cope, The 
Crime of the Century: What BP and the US Government Don’t Want You to Know, THE 
HUFFINGTON POST, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jerry-cope/the-crime-of-the-
century_b_662971.html (last visited June 16, 2011). 
37. 18 U.S.C. § 1115 (2006). 
10
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Treaty Act (MBTA). Under the MBTA, the “taking” of a 
migratory bird “by any means or in any manner” is unlawful.38 
For misdemeanors, liability is strict,39 which means it is 
unnecessary to prove intent to cause the death of birds. The 
Gulf Oil Spill has already killed thousands of birds, making BP 
liable under this Act.40 
Additionally, because the Gulf Oil Spill killed marine 
mammals, BP may be liable for violating the Marine Mammal 
Protection Act (MMPA).41 Like the MBTA, violations of the 
MMPA are misdemeanors, but the MMPA imposes a higher 
culpability standard by requiring violations to be done 
“knowingly.”42 This higher standard does not place such a 
charge out of reach, especially with the spilling of large 
amounts of oil. BP may also be liable for violating the 
Endangered Species Act (ESA). Under the ESA, it is a 
misdemeanor43 to “take,” meaning to wound, harass, or kill,44 a 
member of a species protected by the Act.45 Here, too, the 
prosecution must establish a knowing violation.46 This means 
the actor must anticipate the spill and know that it will cause 
harm to the species.47 
                                                
38. 16 U.S.C. § 703(a) (2006); 50 C.F.R. § 10.12 (2010) (defining “take” as “pursue, 
hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect.”). 
39. 16 U.S.C. § 707(a). 
40. A CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY REPORT, A DEADLY TOLL:  THE GULF OIL 
SPILL AND THE UNFOLDING WILDLIFE DISASTER 1 (2011) (estimating death or harm to 
82,000 birds). 
41. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1362(13), 1362(18)(A) (2006) (defining harassment as “any act of 
pursuit, torment, or annoyance which (i) has the potential to injure a marine mammal 
. . . or (ii) has the potential to disturb a marine mammal ... by causing disruption of 
behavioral patterns.”). 
42. 16 U.S.C. § 1375(b) (under the MMPA, a “person who knowingly violates any 
provision of this subchapter or of any permit or regulation issued thereunder [not 
including takings by commercial fishing operations] shall, upon conviction, be fined 
not more than $20,000 for each such violation, or imprisoned for not more than one 
year, or both”); see also United States v. Hayashi, 22 F.3d 859, 862 (9th Cir. 1994) 
(“Under the MMPA, no criminal penalty can attach for negligent conduct.”). 
43. 16 U.S.C. § 1540(b) (2006) (limiting the punishment for violation to one year in 
prison and/or a fine of $50,000). 
44. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (2006) (defining the term “take” to mean, inter alia, 
harassing, harming, killing, or wounding). 
45. Id. § 1538(a)(1)(A)–(B) (stating that it is unlawful to “take” any endangered 
species within the United States or the territorial Seas of the United States or to take 
endangered species on the high seas). 
46. Id. § 1540(b) (2006) (“Knowingly violate . . . any provision of this chapter, or any 
provision of any permit or certificate issued hereunder.”) (emphasis added). 
47. See United States v. McKittrick, 142 F.3d 1170, 1176–77 (9th Cir. 1998) 
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2.  Clean Water Act 
Under the CWA, it is a misdemeanor to discharge a 
pollutant negligently into navigable waters48 and a felony to do 
so knowingly.49 BP is vulnerable to a criminal suit under the 
negligence provisions because the evidence suggests that it 
took measurable safety risks and exercised a lack of reasonable 
care in observing industry standards leading up to the 
Deepwater Horizon rig explosion and after the blowout. With 
damage estimates upwards of twenty billion dollars, BP is 
potentially on the hook to receive the largest corporate 
criminal fine imposed in U.S. history.50 This fine is imposed 
based on an ordinary negligence standard. Such negligence is 
not difficult to prove51 and it may be coincidentally established 
in the course of the ongoing investigations of the accident.52 
BP should be concerned with this relaxed liability standard 
in light of the prospect that BP’s management process failed to 
adequately identify or address the risks created by late 
changes to well design and procedures.53 Evidence is 
accumulating on your company’s failure to evaluate adequately 
cumulative risks stemming from the cement job, including 
dangerous drilling decisions, a low rate of cement flow and 
cement volume and fewer centralizers than were anticipated in 
                                                
(explaining that the ESA required only that defendant knew he was shooting an 
animal when defendant shot a protected wolf); United States v. St. Onge, 676 F. Supp. 
1044, 1045 (D. Mont. 1988) (holding that it was sufficient to show that the defendant 
knowingly took an animal even though he thought he was taking a different 
unprotected species); United States v. Billie, 667 F. Supp. 1485, 1492 (S.D. Fla. 1987) 
(holding that in prosecution under the ESA, government need only prove that the 
hunter acted with general intent when he shot animal in question); see also KRISTINA 
ALEXANDER, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, R41308, THE 2010 OIL SPILL: 
CRIMINAL LIABILITY UNDER WILDLIFE LAWS (2010). 
48. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1) (2006). 
49. Id. § 1319(c)(2). 
50. Id. § 1319(c)(3)(A). See 18 U.S.C. § 3571 (2006) (stating that under the 
Alternative Fines Act the maximum criminal penalty for the Clean Water Act 
violations is twice the losses resulting from the oil spill). 
51. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1). See United States v. Ortiz, 427 F.3d 1278, 1283 (10th Cir. 
2005) (stating that a person “violates the Clean Water Act by failing to exercise the 
degree of care that someone of ordinary prudence would have exercised in the same 
circumstances, and, in so doing discharges [in violation of the Act]”). 
52. See THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES, INTERIM REPORT ON CAUSES OF THE DEEPWATER 
OIL SPILL AND WAYS TO PREVENT SUCH EVENTS 5–9 (Nov. 16, 2010), available at 
http://www.nap.edu/catalog/13047.html [hereinafter 2010 INTERIM REPORT]. 
53. 2011 NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 9, at 125. 
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the original design.54 Thus, as investigations continue, we fear 
the doors will close on the defenses to negligence.55 
Additionally, the CWA has long been celebrated for its 
invention of the crime of “knowing endangerment.”56 
Conviction requires proof of violation of the no-discharge 
provisions coupled with additional evidence that the doer of 
the deed “knows at that time that he thereby places another 
person in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury.”57 
Penalties include fines up to $250,000 (one million dollars for 
an “organization”) “or imprisonment of not more than 15 years, 
or both.”58 If the DOJ can prove that BP knew that the 
company’s failure to take reasonable care in its offshore 
drilling operations would result in the Spill, then it may be 
able to prove “knowing endangerment” under the CWA.59 
Frankly, the knowing and negligence provisions of the CWA 
place the future of BP—and any number of its executives—
firmly within the discretionary mercy of the DOJ. 
The felony provisions of the CWA establish two prominent 
proof advantages for environmental prosecutors. One is a 
tempered version of “knowingly” that appears in the context of 
environmental crime.60 The other is the so-called “responsible 
corporate officer” doctrine.61 
The leading decision is Judge Betty Fletcher’s ruling in 
United States v. Weitzenhoff,62 which comes down in favor of 
the prosecution on the question of “whether ‘knowingly’ means 
a knowing violation of the law or simply knowing conduct that 
                                                
54. Id. at 97–98. (finding “BP installed only six centralizer subs on the Macondo 
production casting. BP’s original designs called for 16 or more centralizers to be placed 
along the long string.”). 
55. 2010 INTERIM REPORT, supra note 52, at 5–9. 
56. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(3)(A) (2006). 
57. Id. 
58. Id. 
59. See David Uhlmann, After the Spill is Gone: The Gulf of Mexico, Environmental 
Crime, and the Criminal Act, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1413, 1431 (2011) (suggesting that the 
DOJ could allege BP knowingly discharged oil into the Gulf due to the risks taken by 
the company and its partners). 
60. United States v. Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d 1275, 1286 (9th Cir. 1993) (en banc) 
(holding “knowingly” language in CWA does not require proof that defendant knew he 
was violating the law). 
61. 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (c)(5) (defining “person” to include a “responsible corporate 
officer.”). 
62. 35 F.3d 1275 (9th Cir. 1993) (en banc). 
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is violative of the law.”63 This ruling deprives a CWA 
defendant of any number of the “didn’t-know,” “unaware-of-
the-technicalities,” “nobody-told-me,” or “just-doing-my-job” 
defenses that customarily surface in any “complex” 
technological undertaking such as offshore oil drilling. Indeed, 
Judge Kleinfeld said in his Weitzenhoff dissent that the CWA 
reaches too far, declaring that “[t]his statute has tremendous 
sweep. Most statutes permit anything except what is 
prohibited, but this one prohibits all regulated conduct 
involving waters and wetlands except what is permitted.”64 
Judge Kleinfeld also argued that the CWA regulates “[m]uch 
more ordinary, innocent, productive activity. . .than people not 
versed in environmental law might imagine,”65 and that it 
“makes felons of a large number of innocent people doing 
socially valuable work.”66 
In Weitzenhoff, admittedly, this “socially valuable work” was 
done by “midnight dumpers.”67 The defendants “managed a 
sewer plant and told their employees to dump 436,000 pounds 
of sewage into the ocean, mostly at night, fouling a nearby 
beach.”68 It is difficult to sympathize with a manager who 
ordered his employees to  dump intentionally hazardous 
sewage. While our firm will strongly advocate that the Gulf Oil 
Spill was a terrible accident, many will feel the same lack of 
sympathy about BP’s corner-cutting on the Deepwater 
Horizon. 
The Weitzenhoff holding continues to aid prosecutors by 
squeezing “knowingly” defenses down to something closer to 
sleepwalking and inviting convictions for public welfare 
wrongs that are designed to stem the abuses of modern 
industrialism.69 However, under Wietzenhoff, we will claim 
that the prosecutor must prove that “knowingly” committed 
cost-cutting measures resulted in a discharge of oil into the 
Gulf. However, BP cannot claim any “socially valuable work” 
or “unfortunate accident” defenses. 
                                                
63. Id. at 1283. 
64. Id. at 1293. 
65. Id. 
66. Id. 
67. Id. at 1294. 
68. Id. 
69. United States v. Hoflin, 880 F.2d 1033, 1037–38 (9th Cir. 1989). 
14
Washington Journal of Environmental Law & Policy, Vol. 1, Iss. 2 [2011], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjelp/vol1/iss2/1
2011] STRANGER THAN FICTION 233 
 
Similarly, environmental prosecution is aided by the CWA’s 
recognition that a “person” vulnerable to criminal prosecution 
includes “any responsible corporate officer.”70  Again, this 
undercuts the ignorance defense for those who might not have 
known but should have known of the circumstances. A number 
of mid-level and other managers have met their felony fates 
under the criminal environmental laws that have told them 
that their knowledge of serious environmental risks is not up 
to par.71 Reluctantly, we read the case law as allowing U.S. 
prosecutors to thrust criminal environmental law deeply into 
the ranks of BP’s onshore management should they choose to 
go there.72 
3.  Criminal Fraud 
Additionally, as your counsel, we are concerned that 
adversaries will contend that BP seized the basic planning and 
licensing process of offshore oil development and turned it into 
a fabrication factory. Every business executive who aspires to 
tangle with the United States should memorize the criminal 
fraud provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a), which reads in 
pertinent part: 
. . . whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of the 
executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the 
Government of the United States, knowingly and 
willfully— 
1. falsifies, conceals, or covers up by any trick, scheme, 
or device a material fact; 
2. makes any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent 
statement or representation; or 
3. makes or uses any false writing or document 
knowing the same to contain any materially false, 
fictitious, or fraudulent statement or entry; 
                                                
70. Clean Water Act § 309(c)(6), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(6) (2006). See also Nancy 
Mullikan, Holding the “Responsible Corporate Officer” Responsible:  Addressing the 
Need for Expansion of Criminal Liability For Corporate Environmental Violators, 3 
GOLDEN GATE U. ENVTL. L. J. 395 (Spring 2010). 
71. See, e.g., United States v. Dee, 912 F.2d 741 (4th Cir. 1990) (convicting three 
civilian managers and contractors of knowingly managing hazardous wastes without a 
permit). 
72. We understand that “BP onshore” participated in the vital decisions at Macondo. 
See 2011 NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 9, at 125 (Fig. 4.10:  Examples of 
Decisions That Increased Risk at Macondo While Potentially Saving Time). 
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shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more 
than 5 years, or both.73 
To this end, it is imperative that BP’s management 
understands that it is a felony to falsify a material fact in any 
document submitted to an agency of the United States and 
that filling a report with fabrications might lead to multiple 
felony charges. Thus, evidence that BP employees’ falsified 
conditions at the well, either in the amount of oil discharged or 
in the response plan, could result in a felony charge.74 
Based on this law, BP will perhaps appreciate why our firm 
must scrutinize, with a growing sense of apprehension, BP’s 
582-page Oil Spill Response Plan covering all BP operations in 
the Gulf of Mexico. This document has not received glowing 
reviews from our associates because of its far-fetched and 
unsupported claims.75 The document asserts, for example, that 
BP has an “amazing collection of skimming equipment” that 
would enable it to clean up an incredible 20,652,282 gallons of 
oil per day—roughly twice the volume of the Exxon Valdez 
spill.76 How could this possibly be true? The plan also “claimed 
there would be only a 21 percent chance that oil from a spill 
would reach the Louisiana coast within a month.”77 But this 
cannot be true either.78 This spill response plan refers readers 
to experts long since dead79 and expresses “concern for 
walruses, sea otters, sea lions and seals, including all of them 
under the heading ‘sensitive biological resources’—even though 
not a single one of them has lived in the Gulf for the last 
several million years.”80 Despite these lapses, we are confident 
in our firm’s ability to defend any fraud charges based on our 
considerable past successes. In these cases, our general tactic 
                                                
73. 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (2006). 
74. Id. See also id.  §§ 1503, 1505, 1512, and 1519 (obstructing justice). 
75. See FREUDENBURG & GRAMLING, supra note 7, at 53–55 (quoting LEE CLARKE, 
MISSION IMPROBABLE:  USING FANTASY DOCUMENTS TO TAME DISASTER (1999 U. 
Chicago Press)). 
76. Id. at 53. 
77. Id. at 54. 
78. See id. (“[T]he actual spill, with a probability of 100 percent, took only nine days 
to start fouling the coastline”). 
79. See id. (“The go-to wildlife expert listed in the plan, Professor Peter Lutz of the 
University of Miami, had left that institution twenty years earlier, and in a 
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is to argue that a particularly outrageous false statement is 
not a fact but an opinion, that if it is a fact it is not material, 
that if it is material, it was not relied upon, and that if it is 
relied upon, the statement was not uttered with the requisite 
degree of culpability. 
Specifically, to defend matters mentioned above, we will 
argue that BP’s overestimation of cleanup capacity and the 
time needed for spilled oil to reach the shore are matters of 
opinion and references to available experts and walruses are 
entirely immaterial. It helps in cases of this sort to have an 
agency so complacent81 as to be information-oblivious. Fraud 
as a legal concept is fundamentally designed to prevent 
miscalculations by the party deceived.82 No one believes the 
Minerals Management Service (MMS) could be led astray by a 
few careless references to walruses. 
But we insist that you understand that deception cannot be 
the policy of choice when dealing with the federal government. 
As a matter of principle, our firm might agree with BP that a 
freedom to fabricate is part and parcel of corporate free speech 
on the international stage.83 We point out to you that there is a 
right way and a wrong way to change these rules. The path is 
open for BP to diminish the importance of the “material false 
statement” law84 by dissuading the Attorney General from 
                                                
81. Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Transparency, Accountability, and Competency: An 
Essay on the Obama Administration, Google Government, and the Difficulties of 
Securing Effective Governance, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 449, 455 (2011) (“MMS employees 
received free trips and even illicit drugs and the services of paid sex workers from 
industry representatives. In turn, the MMS turned a blind eye on various and sundry 
applications for drilling permits.”); Tim Dickinson, The Spill, The Scandal and the 
President, ROLLING STONE, June 24, 2010, at 54 (“[President Obama] acknowledged 
that his administration had failed to adequately reform the Minerals Management 
Service, the scandal-ridden federal agency that for years had essentially allowed the 
oil industry to self-regulate.”). 
82. See generally N. Anna Envtl. Coal. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 533 F.2d 
655 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (no loss of license for facility because the fault on which it was 
sited was not “capable”); Va. Elec. & Power Co. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 
571 F.2d 1289, 1291–92 (4th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (affirming civil penalties of 
$32,500 for the making of false statements in connection with an application for a 
license to construct a nuclear power plant). 
83. E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 144–45 
(1961) (Black, J.) (stating that no Sherman Act violation can be premised upon a “no-
holds-barred fight” between railroads and truckers to influence the passage of state 
laws); United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 670 (1965) (“Noerr shields 
from the Sherman Act a concerted effort to influence public officials regardless of 
intent or purpose.”). 
84. 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (2006). 
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enforcing this law. Unfortunately, it is beyond the power of BP 
to wash this law away with a flood of indifferent violations. 
4.  Defenses to Criminal Liability 
If BP is rendered criminally vulnerable by tough 
environmental laws, prosecution-friendly doctrines, and the 
familiar practice of multiple counts,85 are they then protected 
by some generic soft-on-crime public sentimentality? It 
appears not. Today’s U.S. culture is not soft on crime but hard 
on crime. “Three strikes and you’re out” has been a steady 
refrain in U.S. criminal law for a generation or more. 86 Tony 
Hayward himself has predicted a punitive streak in U.S. law 
because this is America, after all.87 We predict that the public 
will expect the President to be tough on BP88 and that it should 
be made to pay even if it goes bankrupt in the process.89 
“Three strikes and you’re out” has particular irony when 
applied to BP.90 The company has enjoyed the benefits of its 
three strikes and is not yet out. Strike one was the so-called 
Texas City disaster that killed fifteen workers (injured 170) 
and earned record-setting penalties from the Occupational 
Health and Safety Administration (OSHA). 91 Strike two was 
                                                
85. See, e.g., Clean Water Act § 309(g)(2)(B), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(2)(B) (2006) (a Class 
II civil penalty may be assessed “per day for each day during which the violation 
continues.”). 
86. See Emily Bazelon, Arguing Three Strikes, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2010, § 6 
(Magazine), at 40 (describing the case of Norman Williams, who was sentenced to life 
in prison under California’s repeat-offender law for stealing a floor jack from a tow 
truck). 
87. BP CEO Predicts ‘Illegitimate’ Oil Lawsuit Because ‘This is America’, THE 
HUFFINGTON POST (May 6, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/05/06/bp-ceo-
predicts-illegitim_n_566429.html. 
88. See Stephanie Condon, Americans Don’t Care if BP Goes Bankrupt Paying for Oil 
Spill, Poll Shows, CBS NEWS POLITICAL HOTSHEET (June 15, 2010), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-20007755-503544.html (reporting that 
seven out of ten Americans in the Gallup/USA Today poll say Mr. Obama has not been 
tough enough on BP). 
89. Id. 
90. Jane F. Barrett, When Business Conduct Turns Violent: Bringing BP, Massey 
and Other Scofflaws to Justice, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 287, 295-307 (2011) (indicating 
BP has had six strikes and is still not out). 
91. In 2007, BP pleaded guilty to a felony and paid a $50 million penalty for failing 
to maintain equipment at a Texas City, Texas oil refinery and causing an explosion. 
See United States v. BP Prods. N. Am. Inc., 610 F. Supp. 2d 655, 660 (S.D. Tex. 2009). 
See also Texas City Refinery Explosion, Texas: Safety Failure on March 23, 2005, in 
WHAT WENT WRONG:  INVESTIGATING THE WORST MAN-MADE AND NATURAL DISASTERS 
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the Greater Prudhoe Bay pipeline disaster that put sixty-three 
workers at risk and earned huge penalties from the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).92 Strike three is the 
Gulf Oil Spill disaster, which killed eleven workers and 
threatens to earn record-setting civil penalties under the 
CWA.93 After the first two calamities, BP shuffled a few 
administrators, handed down a few “be careful” directives, and 
pursued a public relations binge to repair the company’s 
reputation.94 As you well know, the Greater Prudhoe Bay 
disaster unleashed a debarment proceeding before the EPA.95 
That prospect was economically dangerous for the company 
and our firm is surprised that BP survived that experience by 
walking away with an ill-defined program for reform and a 
mild admonition.96 
The EPA’s surprisingly mild disposition was no doubt a 
satisfactory outcome for your company and for the attorneys 
who achieved this resolution. But we implore you not to rely on 
past experience. BP has been lifted by the tides of tolerance 
and the impulses of mercy. But never doubt that these 
expressions of benign discretion can desert you quickly in the 
                                                
204 (2011 Hearst Communications) (quoting the U.S. Chemical Safety & Hazard 
Investigation Board “concluded that BP failed to heed or implement safety procedures 
that had been recommended before the explosion.”). 
92. BP pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor, paid a twelve million dollar fine, four 
million dollars in restitution to the state of Alaska, and made a four million dollar 
payment to a nonprofit wildlife fund. See Plea Agreement at 2, 16–18, United States v. 
BP Exploration (Alaska), Inc., No. 3:07-cr-00125 (D. Alaska Oct. 25, 2007). 
93. See Complaint, Center for Biological Diversity, Inc., v. BP America, Inc. et al., 
No. 2:10-cv-01768 (E.D. La. Jun. 18, 2010), reprinted in PHYLLIS SKUPIEN & RITA 
CICERO EDS., 2010 GULF COAST OIL DISASTER:  LITIGATION AND LIABILITY (Thomson 
West 2010) [hereinafter 2010 GULF COAST OIL DISASTER]; see also Complaint of the 
United States of America, United States v. BP Exploration and Production, Inc. et al., 
No. 2:10-cv-04536 (E.D. La. Dec. 12, 2010), available at 
http://www.scribd.com/doc/45341375 USA-Complaint-Against-BP-Et-Al. 
94. The N.Y. TIMES reported on the latest breezes of reform that have swept the 
decks of BP, but noted wryly that the man in charge of BP’s new safety division was 
the same fellow who had detected conspicuous innocence in BP’s role in the 
Transocean disaster. See Clifford Krauss & Julia Werdigier, BP’s New Chief, Not 
Formally in the Role, Is Already Realigning Managers, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 29, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/30/business/energy-environment/30safety.html. 
95. See Lustgarten, supra note 5. 
96. Id. (According to Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Senior Attorney 
Jeanne Pascal, by 2009 EPA’s demands included extra regulations and oversight of BP 
operations not just in Texas and Alaska, but also in the Gulf.  EPA also insisted that 
the company move the Health, Safety and Environmental director back up the chain of 
command to a Vice President position). 
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corridors of the U.S. government. 
In the end, we believe, BP’s best defense against criminal 
charges and debarment is not its long record but its large size. 
The “too big to fail” argument has worked on Wall Street to 
defeat the draconian remedies of “debarment.”97 Prior to the 
Gulf Oil Spill, the Greater Prudhoe Bay pipeline disaster 
inspired debarment proceedings, but the Pentagon stepped in 
and objected as BP was the largest supplier of oil.98 In a much 
quieter fashion, corporate defense attorneys have invented a 
comparable concept “too big to prosecute,” which is an 
excellent description of the defense we intend to develop. 
Fortunately, our firm has considerable experience with these 
transactions that are called “deferred prosecution agreements.” 
These agreements work as follows: 
If companies pay the fine set by the prosecutor and 
submit to probationary terms for good behavior, 
perhaps an outside monitor, then government will defer 
prosecution indefinitely or even drop it entirely. The 
corporation thus avoids the stigma of a criminal trial 
and the bad headlines that depress stock prices.99 
The government needs its offshore oil revenues now more 
than ever. To this end, the DOJ has little incentive to force BP 
to the mat, whether in the name of “Old Testament Justice” 
under the criminal laws or regulatory honor under the civil 
laws. The government’s financial realities afford a partial 
explanation as to why the DOJ previously succumbed so easily 
to the path of “deferred prosecution.”100 
                                                
97. Compare ROBERT J. SHILLER, THE SUBPRIME SOLUTION:  HOW TODAY’S GLOBAL 
FINANCIAL CRISIS HAPPENED, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2008 Princeton U. Press) 
with Federal Contractor Misconduct: Failures of the Suspension and Debarment 
System, PROJECT ON GOVERNMENT OVERSIGHT, May 10, 2002, available at 
http://www.pogo.org/pogo-files/reports/contract-oversight/federal-contractor-
misconduct/co-fcm-20020510.html (finding that, since 1990, forty-three of the 
government’s top contractors paid approximately $3.4 billion in fines/penalties, 
restitution, and settlements and four of the top ten government contractors have at 
least two criminal convictions. Only one of the top forty-three contractors has been 
suspended or debarred from doing business with the government, and then, for only 
five days). 
98. Ron Nixon, Size Protects Government Contractors That Stray, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 
17, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/18/us/politics/18contractor.html?scp=1&s 
q=%22Size%20Protects%20Government%20Contractors%20That%20Stray%22&st=cs. 
99. William Greider, How Wall Street Crooks Get Out of Jail Free, THE NATION (Mar. 
23, 2011), http://www.thenation.com/article/159433/how-wall-street-crooks-get-out-jail-
free?page=0,0. 
100. See Press Release, BP America Inc., BP America announces resolution of Texas 
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Like many attorneys, while we are comfortable arguing 
what is right, we are most confident in being able to rest upon 
precedent. We like the precedent of the “deferred prosecution 
agreement.”101 We also can benefit from the lenient treatment 
of past oil spillers. The convenient truth is that robust 
environmental laws and vigorous prosecutors likely will not 
suffice to bring criminal enforcement to the doorsteps of BP. 
The best preview of the matter is the resolution of the Exxon 
Valdez liabilities. In that case, Exxon Shipping pled guilty to 
three misdemeanors and agreed to pay a fine of $150 
million.102 Of this fine, $125 million vanished and was 
“remitted” (“to forgive or pardon”) to the company because it 
had behaved so nobly in agreeing to pay private claims and 
cleaning up the spill.103 Another $100 million that might have 
been collected for the taxpayers was declared “restitution” and 
went to federal and state governments as might be done in the 
case of stolen automobiles.104 The sole function of the “crime” 
in the Exxon case was to keep ongoing settlement discussion of 
civil damages and natural resource damages on a productive 
note. There is no evidence in the Exxon context of tough-
minded prosecutors seeking retribution and holding corporate 
offenders accountable. The only crime that received legal 
notice was that of the bedraggled scapegoat for the whole 
affair, Capt. Joseph Hazelwood.105 Liability never reached 
Exxon “onshore.” 
The U.S. Supreme Court has also been helpful to BP’s legal 
defense. The Court’s decision in Exxon Shipping v. Baker left 
open the question of whether a ship owner can be liable under 
                                                
City, Alaska, propane trading, law enforcement investigations (Oct. 25, 2007), 
http://www.bp.com/genericarticle.do?categoryId=2012968&contentId=7037819. 
101. Id. 
102. See William H. Rodgers, Jr., Punitive Decisionmaking, 7 U. ST. THOMAS L. J. 89, 
93 (2009) (explaining that on October 9, 1991 the United States Government and State 
of Alaska settled their claims against Exxon Shipping Company and Exxon 
Corporation. Exxon pleaded guilty to three misdemeanor counts, including violations 
of the Migratory Bird Act, the Clean Water Act and the Refuse Act. The plea 
agreement resulted in a criminal fine of $150 million, with $125 million forgiven). 
103. Id. 
104. Id. 
105. See Hazelwood v. State of Alaska, 962 P.2d 196, 197–98 (1998); see also 2009 
PERSONAL STORIES, supra note 9, at 279–82 (Joe Hazelwood, Captain of the Exxon 
Valdez was acquitted of three of four charges, convicted of one misdemeanor; 
sentenced to $50,000 fine and 1000 hours of community service). 
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maritime law for punitive damages without “acquiescence in 
the actions causing harm.”106 The court was divided four to 
four on this matter of “derivative” liability107 and no one doubts 
that the missing vote (Justice Alito) would have favored the 
“corporate” view. 
Exxon Shipping should be applied to limit liability on both 
the civil and criminal fronts. If Exxon cannot be held liable 
without explicit “acquiescence” in the misdeeds of Captain 
Hazelwood, then BP should have clear sailing under both civil 
and criminal law absent proof of an explicit directive from top 
management to cut corners. Our overall strategy, as it was in 
Exxon Shipping,108 is to confine liabilities to the management 
and crew on the vessel itself. To this end, our firm needs every 
shred of evidence (e.g. directives, manuals, announcements, or 
instructions) given to your employees and your contractors 
urging them to “follow the rules,” “put safety first,” or “take 
pride in the job.” 
BP should be aware that the stronger the preachment, the 
greater the distance between liability derived from the scene of 
the accident and liability derived from a corporate 
relationship. The Supreme Court has shown itself to be 
vulnerable to assurances of worthy environmental intent109 
and we hope to give them assurances galore. 
We advise BP to take advantage of two defensive tactics on 
the criminal front. First, you must implicate others partially 
responsible for the spill in all versions of this mishap. The 
“others” should include the U.S. government, the company’s 
employees and its contractors. Some might call this “finger 
pointing” or “scapegoating,” but our firm views the tactic as a 
just and appropriate allocation of responsibility. It is quite 
possible, for example, that Transocean failed to prevent the 
blast and that Halliburton was responsible for errors in the 
cement job and testing that allowed the explosive natural gas 
                                                
106. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 476 (2008). 
107. Id. 
108. Id. 
109. See Burlington N. and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. U.S., 556 U.S. 599, 129 S.Ct. 1870, 
1873, 1875–76, 1880 (2009) (8-1 decision) (holding that Shell Oil did not “arrange” for 
the disposal of hazardous substances because it did not intentionally pollute the 
groundwater at a chemical distribution business though it dictated the transfer 
arrangements, knew of the spills, and provided advice and supervision; Shell had a 
convincing campaign of preachment, instructions, and advice to avoid the pollution its 
behavior virtually guaranteed). 
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to seep into the well.110 
Our strategy is to rerun the legal trajectory of the Exxon 
case and have the “buck” stop with Hazelwood. We do not yet 
know who the “Hazelwood” is in our case, but we implore BP to 
help us identify this man and bring him to justice.111 
Remember, Exxon took unilateral punitive action against 
Hazelwood (he eventually was fired for violation of company 
rules)112 and Exxon executives succeeded in shielding 
themselves. 
Second, in each and every step of the cleanup, BP should 
collect and hide behind “permissions” granted by the United 
States. In the early stages of the accident-to-be, BP “onshore” 
brought the United States into the liability picture with a 
telephone inquiry to MMS to secure a “waiver” in regard to a 
revision in well cementing practices.113 We advise you to repeat 
this move because it will dilute BP’s responsibility. 
What does one expect of the criminal law and BP? Guilty 
pleas on a half-dozen criminal charges that manifest our social 
commitment to human life, wildlife and our environment? A 
billion-dollar fine for the BP? Jail time totaling 100–200 years 
for ten different “responsible corporate officers?” This would be 
                                                
110. Krauss & Werdigier, supra note 94. 
111. See ROWAN JACOBSEN, SHADOWS ON THE GULF:  A JOURNEY THROUGH OUR LAST 
GREAT WETLANDS 60–66 (Bloomsbury USA 2011) (on the roles of BP well site leaders, 
Bob Kaluza and Don Vidrine). We recognize the evidentiary value of the two witnesses 
in the lifeboat who overheard Jimmy Harrell on his phone telling Houston, “I told you 
this was gonna happen.” Id. at 65–66. Our problem with this evidence is that if 
liability moves “to somebody in Houston,” it has moved to BP onshore.  Again, our goal 
is to confine the scapegoats to the vessel. See Editorial, Industry Doesn’t Step Up, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 11, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/12/opinion/12wed1.html (“Who 
is to blame for last month’s catastrophic oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico? The other guy. 
At least that’s what three oil executives, predictably and cynically, told a Senate 
hearing on Tuesday.”). 
112. See 2009 PERSONAL STORIES, supra note 9, at 279–81; see also JOHN KONRAD & 
TOM SHRODER, FIRE ON THE HORIZON:  THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE GULF OIL DISASTER 
261 (2011 Harper Collins) (Transocean survivor, Buddy Trahan stated that the “crew 
and equipment were not at fault” and that “it was a “screwed-up plan.” The sister of 
one of the victims “felt rage at the accusations against the drill crew” and felt that the 
193-page BP report “that parceled out blame among “multiple companies and work 
teams” meant. . . that the drill floor crew . . . was being saddled with ultimate 
responsibility. . . . “How can somebody sit there and blame the victims when they’re 
not here to defend themselves?”). 
113. 2011 NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 9, at 126–27 (approval of BP 
request to set the temporary abandonment plug 3,300 feet below the mudline, a 
departure from the usual 1,000 feet, approved by telephone in less than ninety 
minutes). 
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our “worst case” scenario. But we are confident that very little 
of this will happen. One or two underlings, as Joseph 
Hazelwood learned, should take the fall for the unfortunate 
deaths at the Deepwater Horizon. BP will be asked to sign a 
“deferred prosecution agreement.” Debarment will not happen. 
Heads will not roll on this occasion. 
B. Civil Penalties 
The prospect of civil penalties is more than meets the eye. 
Section 309(d) of the CWA, which applies to fundamental 
offenses such as discharging a “pollutant” without a permit, 
states that “any person who violates [the CWA] . . . shall be 
subject to a civil penalty not to exceed $25,000 per day 
(adjusted to $37,500)114 for each violation.”115 It would appear 
firmly within the realm of possibility that there is but a single 
violation in this matter—the Macondo well blowout—albeit 
with ongoing effects, and thus, we could defend against 
charges of violating Section 301(a)116 of the CWA by claiming 
that any penalties are capped at $25,000 (adjusted to $37,500) 
per day.117 This would be a trivial toll for a company the size of 
BP. 
Unfortunately, Section 311 of the CWA opens the door to 
liability that is far more economically dangerous to BP. In 
addition to discharging “pollutants” into the Gulf of Mexico 
without a permit, we will need to defend BP against violations 
of Section 311(b)(3) of the CWA.118 This subsection prohibits 
the “discharge of oil or hazardous substances” into a variety of 
waters that include “activities under the Outer Continental 
Shelf Lands Act” in amounts that are “harmful” or in ways 
that “may affect natural resources belonging to the United 
                                                
114. See EPA Adjustment of Civil Monetary Penalties for Inflation, 40 C.F.R. § 19.4 
(2009) (adjusting the statutory penalty found in 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) from $25,000 per 
day to $37,500 per day). 
115. Clean Water Act § 309(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) (2006). BP is the “operator” of the 
oil rig and thus would be responsible for the discharge of pollutants from a point 
source. 
116. Our firm will argue that the spill constitutes just one discharge under the CWA. 
See 33 U.S.C. 1311(a). 
117. See 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(7)(A) (2006) (setting civil penalties for per day 
violations of the CWA at $25,000); 40 C.F.R. § 19.4 (2011) (adjusting penalties to 
$37,000 after January 12, 2009). 
118. 33 U.S.C. § 311(b)(3). 
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States.”119 Try as we might, and conceding the clumsy wording 
of Section 311, we do not see a way to defend BP against 
violations of this statute. 
Ineluctably, then, one is drawn to the civil penalty 
provisions of Section 311(b)(7)(A), which state that a person 
who is an operator of an “offshore facility” from which oil is 
discharged “shall be subject to a civil penalty in an amount up 
to $25,000 (adjusted to $37,500)120 per day of violation or an 
amount of up to $1,000 (adjusted to $1,100)121 per barrel of oil . 
. . discharged.”122 If the federal government can prove “gross 
negligence or willful misconduct,” a legal prospect that appears 
quite plausible at this moment, the financial tally rises to a 
civil penalty “of not less than $100,000 (adjusted to 
$140,000),123 and not more than $3,000 (adjusted to $4,300)124 
per barrel of oil . . . discharged.”125 The first formulation (using 
the disjunctive either/or) affords us room to argue that a 
$37,500 per day penalty should suffice to send any message 
that needs to be sent. Considering the severity of the spill, the 
second formulation, $140,000 and a per barrel charge of 
$4,300, is a conceivable legal nightmare that could attend a 
finding of “gross negligence or willful misconduct.”126 
The following factors must be considered when the court 
determines the amount of a civil judicial penalty: the 
seriousness of the violation or violations; the economic benefit 
to the violator, if any, resulting from the violation; the degree 
of culpability involved; any other penalty for the same 
incident; any history of prior violations; the nature, extent, and 
degree of success of any efforts of the violator to minimize or 
mitigate the effects of the discharge; the economic impact of 
the penalty on the violator; and any other matters as justice 
may require.127 None of these factors clearly support BP’s 
defense. To aid the court’s considerations, nonetheless, our 
                                                
119. Id. 
120. 40 C.F.R. § 19.4 (adjusting penalties found in Clean Water Act § 311(b)(7)(A)). 
121. Id. 
122. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(7)(A) (emphasis added). 
123. 40 C.F.R. § 19.4 (adjusting penalties found in Clean Water Act § 311(b)(7)(D)). 
124. Id. 
125. See 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(7)(D) (relating to proof of gross negligence and willful 
misconduct). 
126. Id. 
127. Id. § 1321(b)(8). 
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firm will argue against the seriousness of the violation and 
that neither “negligence” nor “misconduct” occurred. We will 
further contend that the civil penalties, like any criminal 
charges, are a measure of vindictive “piling on,” allowing the 
United States to recover three times for the same 
disaster⎯once for the cleanup, again for the criminal law and 
yet again for the civil penalties. 
Two features of this environmental law of civil penalties 
could significantly increase BP’s fine. The first is the barrel-by-
barrel sum found in Subsection 311(b)(7)(A) of the CWA. The 
quantitative precision of this numerical device cannot help but 
give confidence to government negotiators who only can be 
emboldened when it comes time to “make a deal.” We prefer to 
frame the company negotiations, and draw on client-specific 
needs, without a discordant dollars-per-barrel tune playing in 
the background. 
Second, enforcement of the environmental laws, including 
the CWA, can be initiated by citizens.128 The CWA authorizes 
citizens to bring suit for civil penalties or enforce compliance 
with effluent standards issued by the EPA Administrator or a 
state. These citizens can bring to the table time-tested and 
experienced attorneys. In this matter, we fully expect a citizen 
suit to be filed and we anticipate that it will seek a 
“calculation” of civil penalties under that dollars-per-barrel 
formula.129 As a result, BP may hear more than it wishes about 
“doing the math” which can drive civil penalties into the 
billions.130 
Fortunately for BP’s defense, the U.S. Supreme Court has 
provided ample advantages for defendants to resist citizen 
suits,131 and we will spare no energy in seeking to curtail this 
                                                
128. WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW:  AIR & WATER, Vol. 2 § 4.5 
(West 1986) (with semi-annual updates). The danger of these sorts of lawsuits is 
illustrated by Meister v. U.S. Dep’t of Agriculture, 623 F.3d 363 (6th Cir. 2010). 
129. Complaint, Center for Biological Diversity, Inc. v. BP America, Inc., No. 
10CV01768 (E.D. La. June 18, 2010) reprinted in 2010 GULF COAST OIL DISASTER, 
supra note 93. 
130. Can BP Ever Get It Right?, N.Y. TIMES (June 8, 2010) 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/08/opinion /08tue3.html (“do the math”). See also 
Campbell Robertson & Clifford Krauss, Gulf Spill is the Largest of its Kind, Scientists 
Say, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 2, 2010) http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/03/us/03spill.html 
(discussing the magnitude of the Gulf Spill). 
131. See William H. Rodgers, Jr., The Environmental Laws of the 1970s: They 
Looked Good on Paper, 12 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 33–35 (2010) (discussing standing, 
ripeness, notice, not continuing, and counsel fees as bars or deterrents to citizen suits). 
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symbolic feature of U.S. environmental law. Generally, the 
strategies we expect to pursue are to win the support of the 
U.S. government and to enlist the defenses, provided by 
Supreme Court decisions, to deprive the citizens of a 
meaningful forum to seek relief.132 We also expect to establish 
that, under Section 311 of the CWA, the prohibitions on oil 
discharges are not enforceable by citizen suit.133 
Right now, we are confident in defending the initial estimate 
of 5,000 gallons per day that you provided our law firm and are 
not displeased that considerable uncertainty surrounds this 
figure.134 If this figure grows over time,135 however, our anxiety 
will grow with it. We hope we have said enough on this topic of 
civil penalties to convince you of the considerable value of not 
knowing and never knowing the actual amount of oil spilled 
from the Macondo Well. As your advocates, we are in the 
curious position of advising you that the higher the volume of 
this spill, the steeper the penalty you will pay. 
We recommend that you quickly implement three policies to 
mitigate the impact of high civil penalties. First, the company’s 
                                                
132. See id. 
133. See In re Oil Spill by Oil Rig Deepwater Horizon, 792 F. Supp. 2d 926 (E.D. La., 
2011) (dismissing CWA suit claims on multiple grounds including standing, mootness, 
and the holding in Gwaltney). 
134. Compare FREUDENBURG & GRAMLING, supra note 7, at 12–13 (initial estimates 
were 2% of actual volume; 5000 barrels per day); Justin Gillis & Henry Fountain, Rate 
of Oil Leak, Still Not Clear, Puts Doubt on BP, N.Y. TIMES (June 7, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/08/us/08flow.html; Day 48: The Latest on the Oil 
Spill, N.Y. TIMES (June 7, 2010) http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/08/science/earth 
/08latest.html (“The amount of oil being collected as a result of a containment cap 
placed on the  ruptured well last week has increased and is now up to 11,000 barrels a 
day. . . .”); with Justin Gills, Size of Spill Underestimated, Scientists Say, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 13, 2010) http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/14/us/14oil.html (“There’s just no way 
to measure it,” [statement of BP senior vice president Kent Wells]); RestoreTheGulf. 
gov, United Command Continues to Respond to the Deepwater Horizon (Apr. 25, 2010), 
http://www.restorethegulf.gov/release/2010/04/25/update-8-unified-command- 
continues-respond-deepwater-horizon; Tim Dickinson, The Spill, the Scandal, and the 
President, ROLLING STONE (June 8, 2010), http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/ 
the-spill-the-scandal-and-the-president-20100608. 
135. It does: 
We’re all much too familiar with the aftermath. The Coast Guard’s initial claims 
that the leaking oil was merely what was stored on the rig. Then the “discovery” 
that 1,000 barrels per day were leaking.  (A “game changer,” the Coast Guard 
called it.) Then BP’s denial that 5,000 barrels per day were flowing. Then the 
poignant absurdity of BP clinging to the 5,000-barrels-per-day estimate while it 
was capturing around 15,000 barrels per day through a tube—and barely making 
a dent in the flow. 
See JACOBSEN, supra note 111, at 66–67. 
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immediate use of dispersants, quickly, massively, and at depth 
was—and is—a stroke of genius. The National Research 
Council made clear years ago that dispersants function to 
redistribute spilled oil on a zero-sum basis.136 That is, it is 
possible to keep oil off the surface and out of the wetlands by 
sinking it to depths. We point out that, fortuitously perhaps, 
oil off the surface and out of sight might not be incorporated 
into the calculation of BP’s liability. 
Second, the civil penalties you will pay are likely to be 
linked not to the amount that will be spilled, but to estimates 
of that amount from the government, your company, or other 
sources. To this end, it would be within your obvious interest 
to stop the flow and to curtail it if it cannot be stopped. The 
less obvious strategy is for you to explore, investigate and 
develop methodologies for estimating the amounts of oil lost at 
Macondo. In this context, doubt (and perhaps its close cousins, 
controversy, uncertainty, and opinion) can be serviceable.137 
Third, if the clock keeps ticking and the spill remains 
unabated, BP may have nothing to gain from controlled, 
scientifically reliable measures of the flow. A successful 
capping of the well could afford an opportunity to measure the 
flow as final preparations are made.138 Please understand that 
a measurement such as this could be a disservice to BP’s 
overall defense. If, in the end, there remains considerable 
                                                
136. NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, UNDERSTANDING OIL SPILL DISPERSANTS: 
EFFICACY AND EFFECTS, Executive Summary at 2, 10 (2005), available at 
http://www.nap.edu/catalog/11283.html (describing dispersants as chemical mixtures 
sprayed onto a spill (usually from aircraft) to disperse the oil in the water column, thus 
keeping it off surface waters and beaches). See also 2009 PERSONAL STORIES, supra 
note 9, at 54. 
137. Compare SAFINA, supra note 18, at 92 (BP spokesman stated “We are focused 
on stopping the leak and not measuring it.”) with THOMAS O. MCGARITY & WENDY E. 
WAGNER, BENDING SCIENCE: HOW SPECIAL INTERESTS CORRUPT PUBLIC HEALTH 
RESEARCH 97-127 (2008) (on hiding science and strategies of deliberate ignorance). 
138. Discussing the decision-making process that kept the well shut:  
BP shut the stack and began the well integrity test at about 2:25 pm on July 15. 
For the first time in 87 days, no oil flowed into the Gulf of Mexico. . . . Later that 
afternoon, the science advisors, including McNutt and Hunter, met with 
Secretaries Salazar and Chu to determine whether to keep the well shut in. Based 
on the early pressure data, the group appears to have been firmly in favor of 
reopening the well [thus presenting an occasion to measure the flow]. Garwin, who 
had opposed even undertaking the well integrity test, voiced the strongest opinion, 
arguing BP ought to stop the test immediately and wondering whether it was 
already too late. No one at the meeting appears to have argued in favor of keeping 
the well closed. 
2011 NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 9, at 165 (footnotes omitted). 
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uncertainty about the rate and amount of the flow, we are 
confident that a company with the size of BP might get the 
benefit of the doubt from one or another federal agency.139 
If this citizen suit for civil penalties proceeds against you as 
we expect it to, we are ready to undermine it with a barrage of 
motions and technicalities that the U.S. Supreme Court has 
provided over the years. First, no matter how the suit is 
framed or who the plaintiff is, we will argue that notice is 
inadequate. The 1989 Supreme Court decision in Hallstrom v. 
Tillamook County has evolved into the requirement that notice 
is jurisdictional, and courts have insisted upon a precision of 
notice that is not easily satisfied.140 (Thankfully, no one has 
seemed to notice a later case in which the Court distinguished 
the ongoing violation requirement of citizen suit provisions as 
not jurisdictional.).141 We will further argue that citizens lack 
standing to bring the suit. The Supreme Court has said that 
standing is “jurisdictional” and a constitutional necessity142 
and many courts have argued that environmental plaintiffs 
cannot show injury.143 In every case, we will argue that the 
citizen suit is foreclosed by “diligent” action by the 
government.144 
BP might further lobby the United States to bring a more 
realistic and responsible civil penalty action to foreclose 
                                                
139. See Robert L. Cavnar, BP Wins: EPA Will Agree to Cut Oil Spill Estimate, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 2, 2011, 9:07 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-l-
cavnar/bp-wins-epa-will-agree-to_b_817327.html. 
140. See Hallstrom v. Tillamook Cnty., 493 U.S. 20 (1989); see also: 
Although the Hallstrom decision came down firmly on the side of holding that 
notice is an absolute precondition  to  commencement of  a  citizen  suit, the Court 
carefully, and explicitly, stopped short of holding that the notice requirement ‘is 
jurisdictional in the strict sense of the term.’ Nevertheless, courts applying 
Hallstrom frequently characterize the notice requirement as a jurisdictional 
requirement, and many cite Hallstrom specifically for this proposition, despite the 
reservation in the Court’s Hallstrom decision. 
Karl S. Coplan, Is Citizen Suit Notice Jurisdictional and Why Does It Matter?, 10 
WIDENER L. REV. 49, 49 
(2003). 
141. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 92–93 (1998). See also 
Coplan, supra note 140, at 49. 
142. See Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488 (2009). 
143. See WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., 2 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: AIR AND WATER 84–85 
n.19 (1986 & Supp. 2010) (collecting “no injury” and other standing cases). 
144. Our experience is that the statutory term “diligently prosecuting” found in 33 
U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B) (2006) can be satisfied by the most pedestrian, knee-jerk, and 
wanton actions, so long as there is something that looks like a “decision to enforce” by 
the U.S. or a state. 
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environmental plaintiffs (such as the Center for Biological 
Diversity) who argue that civil penalties should approach the 
statutory maxima prescribed by law.145 Further, we should 
seek to recover our counsel fees from the environmental 
plaintiff who started the suit in the first place.146 Finally, as 
soon as the company stops the flow (or perhaps curtails it 
substantially), we will move to dismiss any CWA citizen 
suits.147 The Supreme Court has held that jurisdiction for 
citizen suits exists only so long as the action complained of, 
here the flow of oil, continues.148 A strange rule—but we are 
happy to support its enforcement. 
BP civil penalties are likely to land where the United States 
says they should land—at one billion dollars. All contingencies 
on this front commend a policy of remaining on good terms 
with the United States. It is to our advantage that the 
adversary we most respect—the Center for Biological 
Diversity—is pursuing you not in the fertile fields of California 
but in the bogged-down swamp of multi-district litigation in 
Louisiana.149 
C. Potential Civil Damages 
We are concerned about BP’s civil liability to injured 
individuals and businesses as a result of the spill. The civil 
liabilities of Exxon landed at approximately one billion dollars 
for its 1989 spill.150 The liabilities for Saddam Hussein’s 
destructive ruination of the Kuwaiti oil fields at the end of the 
Gulf War in 1991 have run past five billion dollars.151 BP’s 
                                                
145. 2010 GULF COAST OIL DISASTER, supra note 93, at 341. 
146. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) allows an award of attorney fees “to any prevailing or 
substantially prevailing party” if such an award is deemed “appropriate.” Several 
successful defendants have recovered attorney fees. See Save Our Springs Alliance, 
Inc. v. City of Dripping Springs, 304 S.W.3d 871 (Tex. App. 2009) (assessing the 
protectors of Edwards Aquifer $86,200 for their trouble). 
147. 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2006). 
148. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49 
(1987). Following cessation of the leak, Judge Barbier dismissed CWA citizens’ suit 
claims under Gwaltney because the Court did not have subject matter jurisdiction for 
Clean Water Act suits when there were no ongoing violations. See In re Oil Spill by Oil 
Rig Deepwater Horizon, 792 F. Supp. 2d 926, 932 (E.D. La., 2011). 
149. See generally In re Oil Spill by Oil Rig Deepwater Horizon, 792 F. Supp. 2d 926. 
(dismissing citizen suit Master Complaint in its entirety). 
150. See Exxon Shipping v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 471 (2008). 
151. See EDITH BROWN WEISS, STEPHEN C. MCCAFFREY, DANIEL BARSTOW 
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near-certain liabilities are potentially many times that 
amount, given the economic configuration of the Gulf, as 
fisheries are closed, lay-offs ensue and businesses hunker 
down. BP must think in terms of thirty to forty billion dollars 
in liability. 
Fortunately, U.S. tort law has been infiltrated in recent 
years by various “alternative dispute mechanisms.”152 These 
are customarily justified as beneficial improvements in 
efficiency and fairness in the delivery of compensation to 
victims.153 Perhaps they are. But compared to what? The 
present system, of course: courts; juries; agencies; and lawyers. 
Frankly, BP wants no part of this scene, populated as it is 
with fervent and able class action lawyers who are 
indefatigable investigators154 and fearless federal judges 
brimming with compassion and confidence.155 BP has no 
interest whatsoever in meeting an oil-spill jury in Louisiana, 
Mississippi, or Texas, recalling perhaps that the Exxon Valdez 
jury rang up a five billion dollar punitive damage award on 
Exxon. To be sure, the Supreme Court bailed Exxon out of its 
immediate punitive damage woes. The only consolation for BP 
is that its punitive-damages will be “limited” to whatever large  
sum the company is obliged to pay out in compensatory 
payments. 
On this civil liability front, BP is already on the defensive as 
the lawsuits pour in. Tort lawyers are rounding up their 
clients, courts are clearing their dockets and Attorneys 
General are preparing suits against BP. We will work first and 
foremost to “contain” this flood of litigation with the same 
                                                
MACGRAW, A. DAN TARLOCK, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY 728 n.2 
(2d ed. 2007). By the way, we are hoping against hope that BP acts so that this oil spill 
is stopped short of the records set by Saddam Hussein. Your attorneys cringe at the 
prospects of a “worse than Saddam” publicity campaign launched against BP. See 
FREUDENBURG & GRAMLING, supra note 7, at 13 (in the end, “Saddam Hussein had 
managed to spill more than escaped from Macondo, but that wasn’t easy”). Of course, 
Saddam was trying to spill the oil while BP is trying to stop it. 
152. See Julia Ann Gold, ADR Through a Cultural Lens: How Cultural Values Shape 
Our Disputing Process, 2 J. DISP. RES. 289 (2005). 
153. See generally id. 
154. See, e.g., Geov Parrish, Brad Marten and Billy Plauche Tackle the Gulf Oil 
Crisis—From Seattle, SUPER LAWYERS (July 2011), http://www.superlawyers.com 
/washington/article/Battle-in-the-Bayou/659e064d-fb8d-4a18-b170-1952d0167dfd.html; 
Scott Summy, Esq., Baron & Budd in 2010 GULF COAST OIL DISASTER, supra note 93. 
155. For one among many profiles in judicial courage, see Aquifer Guardians in 
Urban Areas v. Federal Highway Admin., 779 F.Supp. 2d 542 (W.D. Tex. 2011). 
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determination that the Corps of Engineers displays in dealing 
with record-high waters on the Mississippi. 
Accordingly, on the matter of civil liability, we recommend a 
“breakout strategy,” something never tried before.156 We 
recommend BP seek a meeting with the U.S. Attorney General, 
and hopefully the President. BP will pledge to establish, 
immediately and “without restriction,” a twenty billion dollar 
compensation fund to pay the accumulating claims. At this 
private meeting, all BP executives must demonstrate complete 
and unqualified remorse for the accident. Your company must 
pledge to set things right, to honor your commitments and to 
pay all legitimate claims.157 BP must leave the distinct 
impression that no child goes hungry, no widow aggrieved, no 
business disadvantaged and no fisherman uncompensated. 
We advise BP’s “first impression” meeting with the U.S. 
President and the Attorney General to come off as a generous 
display of corporate benevolence. BP may say that it is “on 
probation,” or that the company’s Board of Directors is “eager 
to make amends” and ready “to get on with the job of making 
everybody whole in the Gulf.” Your hosts in the White House 
will call this the “BP Oil Spill,” but we advise you to refer to it 
as the Gulf Oil Spill. We do not believe it would be appropriate 
at this first meeting to seek assurances (nor would they be 
granted) that your generosity on this matter of compensation 
be reciprocated on the topics of criminal law, civil penalties, or 
natural resource damages. Should these subjects arise at the 
meeting, you should say that BP wishes only to demonstrate 
its good faith, to earn trust and respect and to prove that it 
will be a reliable partner. We expect the federal government 
will accept your generous offer.158 If accepted, the federal 
                                                
156. See Zyg Plater, Learning from Disasters: Twenty-One Years After the Exxon 
Valdez Oil Spill, Will Reactions to the Deepwater Horizon Blowout Finally Address the 
Systemic Flaws Revealed in Alaska?, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. 11041, 11045 (2010), available 
at http://www.elr.info/articles/vol40/40.11041.pdf; Kristen Choo, The Price of Oil, 96-
Aug A.B.A. J. 34, 36 (2010), available at http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article 
/the_price_of_oil (finding that the agreement between President Obama and BP 
Chairman Carl Henric-Svanburg is “unprecedented). 
157. See Press Release, supra note 11. 
158. The government’s Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund contains limited funds. See 
2011 NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 9, at 135 (explaining that the Oil 
Spill Liability Trust Fund held only $18,600,000 on the day the rig exploded and 
highlighting that by November 2010, BP had paid the federal government over $580 
million in response costs). 
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government is free to announce the agreement in any way it 
chooses—hopefully through a Presidential Speech from the 
Oval Office.159 
What are we hoping to achieve with our stunning offer of a 
“claims compensation arrangement?” We seek nothing less 
than the displacement of the current public compensation 
system based on legal and equitable theories with a private 
one of our own making. We see the present legal system as 
threatening to BP and advise the company to steer clear of the 
present system. 
The time is now for BP to suggest such a compensation 
scheme, as U.S. tort law is vulnerable to this kind of wholesale 
transformation. The breakout strategy we recommend is that 
BP establishes its own compensation system capable of 
affording a BP forum, process and law. Its essential features 
are “independence,” private control, a capacity to say “no,” and 
the backing of the U.S. government. 
1. Developing an Independent Compensation System 
The requirement of an “independent” compensation system 
is an implacable necessity to gain any semblance of public 
acceptance. You must invent a compensation system that is 
“independent” of any government or corporate entity and start 
funneling your compensation efforts (apart from cleanup) to it. 
We recommend that your corporation stop calling its payouts 
“BP compensation” and start calling them compensation from 
the Independent Gulf Claims Facility Process.160 BP must 
convince the world that this process is “independent,”161 
referring to the placement of space, distance, process and 
organization between BP and the compensatory payouts. As an 
“independent” compensation system, the administrator of the 
system must not be subject to “official legal status or court 
                                                
159. Statement by the President After Meeting with BP Executives, THE WHITE 
HOUSE, OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY (June 16, 2010, 2:25 PM), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/statement-president-after-meeting-with-
bp-executives. 
160. See GULF COAST CLAIMS FACILITY, http://www.gulfcoastclaimsfacility.com (last 
visited June 5, 2011). 
161. Convincing the world is achieved by convincing oneself first. See generally 
MICHAEL SHERMER, THE BELIEVING BRAIN: FROM GHOSTS AND GODS TO POLITICS AND 
CONSPIRACIES—HOW WE CONSTRUCT BELIEFS AND REINFORCE THEM AS TRUTHS 
(2011). 
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imposed authority.”162 The compensation system is 
“independent” because its administration is not beholden to BP 
or the government, but only to the claimants.163 This myth of 
“independence” 164 from legal or court-imposed authority is so 
serviceable to our cause that BP should persist in that 
characterization for as long as the courts allow.165 
Ironically, your company’s criticism of its own compensation 
process reinforces the perception that the system is 
“independent.” To this end, you may criticize it for wasting BP 
money, for squandering good will, for undermining public 
confidence and for being hasty and imprudent in its accounting 
practices.166 In a similar vein, it would not hurt BP if the 
generous compensation scheme were to be denounced by some 
established public figure as a “shakedown” by the U.S. 
government.167 We believe this sub-theme of “coercion” and 
“reluctant unwillingness to submit” by BP can serve our 
interests in the longer haul. In response to charges of this ilk, 
our firm recommends a company policy of “coy denial.” For 
example, BP can discount critics as wrong, while pointing out 
that most companies are slow to celebrate an unanticipated 
expenditure of twenty billion dollars. 
                                                
162. Moira Herbst, Pressure on Kenneth Feinberg to Disclose BP Pay Deal, REUTERS 
(Nov. 23, 2010, 2:03 AM), http://in.mobile.reuters.com/article/article/idINIndia-
53083520101122. 
163. At a meeting with residents affected by the spill in Kenner, Louisiana, Kenneth 
Feinberg said of the Gulf Coast Claims Facility: “It is independent. It is not part of BP. 
It is not part of the government. It is an independent program and I am beholden to 
neither of them. I am working for you.” Lea Winerman, BP Set to Hand Over Control 
of $20B Gulf Coast Oil Claims Fund, BPS NEWSHOUR (Aug. 20, 2010 4:07 PM), 
http://www.BPs.org/newshour/rundown/2010/08/bp-to-hand-over-damage-claims-
process-gulf-coast-claims-facility.html. 
164. Gulf Coast Claims Facility Frequently Asked Questions, in 2010 GULF COAST 
OIL DISASTER, supra note 93, at 291 (the GCCF is an “independent claims facility” and 
the Claims Administrator “is an independent, neutral fund administrator”). 
165. On February 2, 2011, the District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana 
ordered BP and its agents, including Kenneth Feinberg, to refrain from referring to 
Feinberg as “ ‘neutral’ or ‘completely independent’ of BP.”  See In re Oil Spill by Oil Rig 
Deepwater Horizon, 792 F. Supp. 2d 926 (E.D. La., 2011) (order granting in part a 
motion to supervise ex parte communications with putative class). 
166. See John Schwartz, BP Says Spill Settlement Terms Are Too Generous, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 17, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/18/us/18bp.html. 
167. See Richard Adams, Joe Barton: The Republican Who Apologized to BP, THE 
GUARDIAN (June 17, 2010, 6:12 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/richard-adams-
blog/2010/jun/17/joe-barton-bp-apology-oil-spill-republican. 
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2. Private Control of the Independent Claims Settlement 
Process 
The requirement that the compensation system be “private” 
is indispensable to its success. Our firm recommends that you 
hire a private law firm paid entirely by your company, charged 
with the responsibility of designing and processing all spill-
related claims. This is a significant enterprise; we are 
recommending displacing overnight substantial portions of 
state legal systems with a privately administered 
compensation system. Not all attorneys are suited for this job 
and the choice must be carefully made.168 We must warn you 
that each time the corporation chooses to exercise its 
“ownership” of this “private” claims process there will be a 
price exacted at the independence end of the spectrum. You are 
free to compensate this law firm as you choose, but the myth of 
independence will suffer a setback each time the public reads 
the compensation of the claims manager is a private matter 
between “me and BP.”169 
That said, being “private” is the way this claims facility can 
remain free of legal rigidity or court-imposed authority. It 
must not be held back by the necessities of due process, notice 
or public participation. Quite the contrary, the process BP is 
inventing is filled with administrative black holes, expressed 
as endless confusion over claim forms, representation of 
claimants, referrals, fees, necessary documentation, waivers of 
the right to sue, procedures and constantly changing avenues 
of legitimacy.170 The claims website will be humming with new 
                                                
168. See, e.g., Terry Carter, Master of Disasters: Is Ken Feinberg Changing the 
Course of Mass Tort Resolution?, 97-Jan A.B.A. J. 32 (2011), available at 
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/master_of_disasters. 
169. Mr. Feinberg stated at a news conference that his compensation was 
“something between me and BP.” Frederic J. Frommer, Administrator Has to ‘Sell’ BP 
Victims on Money, MSNBC.COM (July 19, 2010 1:53 PM), 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/38311190/ns/business-oil_and_energy/t/administrator-
has-sell-bp-victims-money. See also John Schwartz, Comments by Overseer of BP Fund 
Irk Lawyers, THE N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 21, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/22 
z/us/22feinberg.html (reporting that “Mr. Feinberg has repeatedly said that he is 
acting independently of BP and the government, and he openly acknowledges that BP 
is paying for his work—’who better?’ he says—saying taxpayers should not be footing 
the bill.”). 
170. See Campbell Robertson & John Schwartz, Many Hit By Spill Now Feel Caught 
in Claim Process, N.Y.TIMES (Apr. 19, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/19/us 
/19spill.html; see also Alfred R. Light, Protocols for the Gulf Coast Claims Facility: An 
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business, but any change of direction is best justified by 
reference to the “private nature” of the process. 
BP has three immediate problems. First, it needs a favorable 
forum. Second, it needs a favorable process for displacing 
other, more dangerous forums. And, third, it needs a favorable 
law that will work to minimize its liabilities. 
We propose to solve all three of these problems for BP and 
can recommend the best man for the job: Kenneth Feinberg.171 
Feinberg is highly competent and anxious to undertake this 
important public service for BP. He has overseen a number of 
notable mediations and claim settlements in the past, 
including serving as Special Master of the seven billion dollar 
September 11th Victim Compensation Fund172 and serving as 
Special Master in Agent Orange, asbestos personal injury, 
wrongful death, Dalkon shield and DES (pregnancy 
medication) cases. We have investigated the matter and 
understand that you can hire Feinberg’s six-lawyer 
Washington, D.C., firm, Feinberg Rozen, for a flat fee of 
$850,000 per month for labor and overhead costs.173 That 
would be thirty million dollars over a three-year period. The 
average hourly rate, were the firm paid on an hourly basis, 
would be about $1,000 per hour—quite reasonable in the 
circumstances. Thus you can afford to pay this man what he 
deserves and provide him with necessary support that befits a 
“private” operation.174 
Unlike the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, 
                                                
Etiquette of Equivocation, 25 TOXICS LAW RPTR. 985 (2010) (examining Draft Protocol 
for GCFC released to state officials in July 201 and the Protocol for Emergency 
Advance Payments released in August 2010 and finding that provisions are becoming 
“less precise and more ambiguous”). 
171. Kenneth Feinberg is the founder and managing partner of the alternative 
dispute resolution firm Feinberg Rozen, LLP. He is the current administrator of the 
Gulf Coast Claims Facility. 
172. Working over a thirty-three-month period, Mr. Feinberg eventually convinced 
97% of the eligible claimants to settle through the fund rather than file lawsuits. The 
Price of Oil, supra note 156, at 40. 
173. See Herbst, supra note 162 (citing a report commissioned by Mr. Feinberg and 
created by former Attorney General Michael Mukasey, now a partner with Debevoise 
& Plimpton, that released some details about Feinberg’s compensation). 
174. “On July 15, 2010, Feinberg, flying on a private jet paid for by BP, toured 
Louisiana and tried to assure affected residents they would be fairly compensated.” 
Brian J. Donovan, Will Victims of the BP Oil Gusher Also Be Victims of Class Action 
Lawsuits and the BP Oil Spill Victim Compensation Fund? (July 16, 2010), 
http://donovanlawgroup.wordpress.com/2010/07/19/165. 
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which was created by an Act of Congress and administered by 
the DOJ, the BP fund our firm proposes is fundamentally a 
“private” operation. It differs from trusts set up by companies 
to compensate victims, such as those created by asbestos and 
pharmaceutical companies, which have been overseen by 
judges. As administrator of this hypothetical compensation 
fund, Feinberg has told us that he would be operating under 
“no official legal statute or court-imposed authority.”175 He is 
free of the Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial 
Disputes (and its disclosure provisions) because he is not a 
referee between adversaries. In other words, he would be a 
private party asked by both sides to design and implement the 
Gulf Coast Claims Facility on behalf of everyone involved.176 
He will be weighing the merits of individual claims and thus 
all BP fund claimants must trust the knowledge, experience, 
and fairness of our man. We are especially drawn to the 
“private party” pledge. This is a forum that could be tolerated 
by BP. 
Mr. Feinberg will define his own process, make up his own 
law, and write his own rules. We are confident that the 
compensation scheme proposed will be the most fair to BP. 
The public posture of the “private” claims facility is 
important because the claims facility will come under 
sustained criticism. It must be alert to fraud and quick to 
denounce it. Lists of proven cheaters could be sent to local 
prosecutors, who are ever ready to capitalize on “easy cases” 
with a high publicity value. The claims facility folks must be 
insistent upon high standards of proof because, no doubt, many 
deserving claimants will be turned away. The person who runs 
this operation must be ready for the inevitable battles over the 
private claims facility.177 
                                                
175. Herbst, supra note 162. 
176. Compare John Schwartz, Fund Official Not Neutral, Judge Rules, N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 2, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/03/us/03feinberg.html (reporting that 
Judge Barbieri ordered Mr. Feinberg to make clear to potential litigants that he is 
acting on behalf of BP) with Alfred R. Light, The Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Trust 
and the Gulf Coast Claims Facility: The “Superfund” Myth and the Law of Unintended 
Consequences, 5 ENVTL. L. J. 87 (2011). 
177. See generally John Schwartz, Man With $20 Billion to Disburse Finds No 
Shortage of Claims or Critics, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 19, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/19/us/19feinberg.html (“In an interview, Mr. 
Feinberg was undaunted. ‘I will not pay claims that can’t be proven, that lack proof, 
that are not substantiated,’ he said. ‘I won’t do it!’”); Master of Disasters, supra note 
168 (discussing Mr. Feinberg). 
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3. The Capacity to Say “No” 
Like any legal arrangement, these three goals of ours, a BP 
forum, a BP process, and a BP law, are interrelated. These 
goals must function together to allow the BP claims 
administrator to say “no,” and send any claim back to the 
“black hole” (we prefer this characterization) of the 
conventional compensation system. Our goal is to set up an 
arrangement where we can pay the “easy” claims (at a 
discount, of course) and deny the hard claims. 
Strategically, in choosing its own law, BP will be able to 
circumvent pockets of law invented to aid claimants in 
recovery. For example, under the Oil Pollution Act (OPA), 
responsible parties like BP are liable for the removal costs and 
damages that result from the incident.178 The OPA relaxes 
proximate cause defenses for subsistence claims.179 Further, 
responsible party (RP) compensatory payments do not preclude 
additional recoveries under the generally available tort law.180 
To this end, OPA is especially solicitous of “subsistence” 
fishermen.181 
This fine illustration of easier proof for subsistence claims 
and larger recoveries for all claimants underscores why BP 
must adopt a claims process empowered to say “No.” It is 
possible that OPA’s version of “subsistence” does not exist 
outside of Alaska, but we are reluctant to advance that legal 
argument in the presence of thousands of people in the Gulf 
who feel aggrieved because they have been deprived of their 
livelihoods.182 We see no reason to be confrontational about a 
matter that we can bury through more subtle legal defenses. 
The BP claims administrator needs a universal, pedestrian 
and familiar legal defense that allows the rejection of any and 
all claims as a matter of discretion. This generic defense is 
“proximate cause.” For example, damage from the spill to a 
New York fish company untouched by the oil is “distant, 
remote, and unforeseeable.” BP has done enormous damage 
                                                
178. 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a) (2006). 
179. Id. § 2702(b)(2)(C). 
180. See id. § 2718. 
181. Id. § 2702(2)(A), (C). 
182. See id. § 2702(b)(2)(C) (Damages “for loss of subsistence use of natural 
resources” are recoverable by any “claimant” who so uses them); see also JACOBSEN , 
supra note 111, 10-20. 
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throughout a highly integrated economy and thousands of 
businesses (think Florida resorts, New Orleans shippers, 
Chicago shrimp buyers) can prove this damage. The 
independent claims administrator needs to lay the groundwork 
for an assertion that the extent of BP’s responsibility for 
potential claims can be reasonably curtailed by traditional 
notions of “proximate cause.” 
To develop this defense, we recommend BP hire a 
“distinguished Harvard Professor” to prepare a report arguing 
that “proximate cause” remains a viable defense even after the 
1990 OPA. Thus the Harvard Law School will hand BP a 
universal proximate cause defense that will enable BP to say 
“no” for a substantial number of economic claimants whose 
injury is not closely linked to the oil spill. Though it might 
gloss over the distinctions we have mentioned between the 
“subsistence” and the other economic claimants, the report will 
merely confirm the state of the law.183 
Despite these efforts, the “proximate cause” defense will not 
adequately address “subsistence” claimants. These claims 
must be defeated on alternative grounds. The economically 
strong and well-recorded claims based on damage farther from 
the spill must be denied on grounds of “proximate cause.” But 
the subsistence people who are closer to the spill, with 
sympathies working in their favor, must be denied on grounds 
of “poor documentation.”184 This modest requirement of simple 
records is an insurmountable mountain to people who keep no 
records. A rule that paperwork be completed “in English” 
sounds simple enough even though it might entail a platoon of 
workers, helpers, law students or agents to meet the 
requirement. 
In fashioning the company rules for the claims facility, BP 
should exclude attorneys in order to keep the process quick, 
simple, efficient, cheap, and down to earth. Remember, the 
alternative that BP is promising to avoid, and the one that 
                                                
183. See generally Memorandum from John C. P. Goldberg, Professor at Harvard 
Law School, to Kenneth Feinberg, Liability for Economic Loss in Connection with the 
Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill (Nov. 22, 2010), available at 
http://gulfcoastclaimsfacility.com/Goldberg.Memorandum.of.Law.2010.pdf. 
184. GULF COAST CLAIMS FACILITY, FINAL RULES GOVERNING PAYMENT OPTIONS, 
ELIGIBILITY AND SUBSTANTIATION CRITERIA, AND FINAL PAYMENT METHODOLOGY 2 
(2011), available at http://www.gulfcoastclaimsfacility.com/FINAL_RULES.pdf 
(“Adequate documentation of damage attributable to the Oil Spill is required.”). 
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rushes into the minds of all claimants, is the prolonged legal 
disaster that befell the 32,000 plaintiffs in the Exxon case.185 
Let the world believe that this drawn-out process is what 
attorneys offer. Though, admittedly, Brian O’Neill and his 
team did a brilliant job on behalf of the fishing-class plaintiffs 
in Exxon,186 the general public does not necessarily see it this 
way. The Exxon case ended badly for the fishermen and BP can 
improve upon this outcome. 
It will be indispensable for the Gulf Claims Facility to 
develop, define, and enforce a complete system of “waivers” 
and “releases” that will protect BP from additional and future 
claims. Remember, the people you intend to pay have certain 
entitlements, such as tort remedies above and beyond those 
promised by the 1990 OPA,187 and those people must surrender 
these rights “voluntarily” as a condition of accepting your 
compensation. 
This “waiver” conditioned upon releases of all present and 
future claims represents the most effective way to implement a 
company policy of “our way or the highway.” Some courts do 
not like this coercive practice,188 but it was widely used by 
Exxon in Alaska.189 The special magic in this waiver is that it 
permits BP to exploit the very fear, frustration and economic 
devastation that the oil spill has spawned. We will offer the 
only way out for these claimants, money in the hand today; the 
greater their need, the more willing they will be to take what 
we offer and sell their future legal prospects.190 This tactic 
enables BP to continue—and amplify—the campaigns it 
conducted historically against trial lawyers, class actions, and 
                                                
185. See generally 2009 PERSONAL STORIES, supra note 9. 
186. See generally DAVID LEBEDOFF, CLEANING UP:  THE STORY BEHIND THE BIGGEST 
LEGAL BONANZA OF OUR TIME (1997). 
187. 33 U.S.C. §§ 2718, 2751 (2006). 
188. Alabamians Urged Not to Sign BP Waivers, OIL SPILL CLAIMS FUND (Aug. 8, 
2010), http://oilspillclaimsfund.com/alabamians-urged-not-to-sign-bp-waivers. 
189. See J. Steven Picou, When the Solution Becomes the Problem:  The Impacts of 
Adversarial Litigation on Survivors of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, 7 U. ST. THOMAS 
L.J. 68 (2009). 
190. See, e.g., Gulf Oil Spill Damages, Phase Two, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 14, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/14/opinion/14mon2.html; Richard Fausset & Louis 
Sahagun, Gulf Oil Spill:  One Year Later and Portraits From the Gulf, LOS ANGELES 
TIMES (Apr. 19, 2011), http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-oil-spill-
html,0,6578241.htmlstory (“The oil might not be as visible in the gulf, but the 
residents are still coping with effects of the nation’s largest offshore oil spill.”). 
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big government. Better yet, in this new light, Exxon’s twenty-
year war of attrition against the Alaska fishermen is not only a 
legal triumph for the oil industry—it is a threat and a promise 
of what happens to those who choose an alternative legal 
future to the one offered by your company’s “independent” 
claims facility. 
In this struggle for the loyalties of the oil spill victims, BP 
will discover creative ways to undermine the credibility of trial 
lawyers and others who are part of the “system” for helping 
real victims in real time. To mention one wild example, we 
fully expect one of your oil drilling partners—Transocean 
perhaps—to file suit against the widows of the men killed in 
the loss of the Macondo Well.191 This would be part of a legal 
maneuver to limit liability under an archaic law. In its 
magnanimity, BP wants no part of this kind of widow-
witching. BP is free to cite the tactic as illustrative of why your 
compensation system is superior to business as usual. 
For an illustration of why the BP claims waivers must leave 
nothing to future legal happenstance, consider Loretz v. Regal 
Stone, Ltd.,192 a class action brought by Dungeness Crab 
Skippers and Crew Members harmed by the COSCO BUSAN 
oil spill. The accident occurred when the cargo ship collided 
with the San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge on November 7, 
2007. The case raised state law claims under the legal theories 
of negligence, nuisance and strict liability. These claimants 
had received over sixteen million dollars through the OPA 
Claims Process.193 In Loretz, the court assessed additional 
damages of $343,332.17, along with two attorneys’ fee awards 
of $854,842.95 and $427,630. Your company must do all in its 
power to avoid this kind of serial assessment. 
Congress said these fishermen had these “extra” rights. BP 
cannot affirmatively divest these people of their rights, but BP 
can squeeze them into submission—to the point that these 
rights are voluntarily surrendered. Persistent necessity will do 
the legal job for us. 
We are confident that the disaster BP created, and the 
cascade of anxieties let loose by unpaid bills, lost jobs, and 
                                                
191. Oil Spill Widow: Transocean is Suing Me, CNN (Apr. 20, 2011), 
http://mag.ma/cnn/1291071. 
192. 756 F. Supp. 2d 1203 (N.D. Cal. 2010). 
193. See id. 
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missing fish will drive these people to BP’s “independent” 
claims facility. BP might wish to invent a system of “partial 
payments,” which will increase dependency and raise hopes. 
Additionally, BP should stay alert to moments of particular 
urgency, such as holidays, which multiply the stresses of 
closing opportunity. Throughout this process, BP will 
consistently offer these people a financial “bird in the hand.” 
The proverbial alternative, “the two in the bush,” is a distant 
and terrifying option of another Exxon “crash.” Reasonable 
people will choose the BP option, “independent” or not, because 
it is the best one available. 
When claimants sign their rights away, nobody will quibble 
about the scope of the release. Our motto is “the broader, the 
better.” We further recommend inclusion of a hidden clause in 
the waiver form. If a claimant gives up the right to sue BP and 
other responsible parties and pursues a settlement amount, 
this claimant must sign off not only for him or herself, but for 
“affiliates” as well. This broad waiver covertly would force the 
individual to sign off for his or her spouse, parents and heirs. 
For commercial claimants, this rule also applies; the 
commercial claimants would be obliged to sign away the rights 
of their partners, shareholders and others to sue. 
Finally, our firm must emphasize that it is imperative for 
BP to remain steadfast and firm in its administration of this 
claims process. Wal-Mart did not become the largest 
corporation in the world by readily paying off claimants. 
Everybody remembers that Exxon “won” its oil spill case, but 
few recall the fury with which it attacked that punitive 
award.194 Your company’s actions will attract critics, but you 
will have answers for them all.195 
                                                
194. The Exxon Valdez Reopener, supra note 20, at 184 (Exxon filed “more than 60 
petitions and appeals, sought 23 time extensions and filed more than 1,000 motions, 
briefs, requests and demands” and claimed jury misconduct and jury tampering.). 
195. See, e.g., Troy King Blasts Oil Spill Compensation Plan; Attorney General and 
Surgeon General to Visit, Al.com (July 14, 2010, 5:00 AM), 
http://blog.al.com/live/2010/07/troy_king_blasts_oil_spill_com.html (Troy King, 
Alabama Attorney General stating that the BP compensation fund was “collusive (with 
BP) at best and contrary to the public interest at worst); BP Compensation Fund 
Controversy Addressed by Motley Rice Attorney Don Migliori, MOTLEY RICE (September 
13, 2010), http://www.motleyrice.com/news/view/bp-compensation-fund-controversy-
addressed-by-motley-rice-attorney-don-migliori (“The special master is really there to 
get claims paid for as little as possible as quickly as possible so that that liability goes 
away.”); BP Claims Report, Gulf Coast Claims Facility Promises: A Timeline, http://bp-
claims-report.com/gulf-coast-claims-facility (last visited Nov. 14, 2011); Rachel Slajda, 
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4. The Backing of the U.S. Government 
It is important to underscore our legal conviction that all 
claims for “removal costs or damages shall be presented first to 
the responsible party.”196 Shortly, the President will designate 
BP a responsible party.197 Overall, it will be BP’s strategy to 
pay or deny these claims as quickly and completely as possible. 
It is important to secure—and maintain—U.S. support for our 
claims process and its preclusive effects throughout. 
We believe the time is ripe for a wholesale displacement of 
public compensation measures with a “private” system, such as 
the one we are proposing here. Fortuitously for BP, corporate 
America long has been waging a war on the healthy features of 
the U.S. justice system that BP is most anxious to avoid. It is 
winning that war.198 Tort lawyers, and class actions in 
particular, are a popular political target. BP should be most 
happy to do its duty to take on this “litigation monster.” 
The twenty billion dollar down payment should suffice to 
cover these claims and allow you to prevent this process from 
spinning out of control. You have a direct pipeline to your 
“private” if not “independent” decision maker. If twenty billion 
dollars is an “overpayment,” and if Mr. Feinberg wields his 
“proximate cause” axe with sufficient enthusiasm, the 
unclaimed funds of course will be returned to BP. 
In sum, we believe that twenty billion dollars will cover your 
civil liability. You can comfortably argue that the BP 
compensation system is superior to any alternatives. If you 
“underpay,” that is not BP’s problem. That is a problem for the 
states or for the federal government. BP cannot be fairly 
blamed for disadvantageous choices made by desperate people. 
D. Response Costs and the Cleanup 
In 1990, post-Exxon Valdez, Congress thrust responsible 
                                                
BP: Spill Claimants Can’t Sue Until They’re Denied by the Escrow Fund First, TPM 
Muckraker (Sept. 14, 2010), http://tpmmuckraker.talkingpointsmemo.com/2010/09/bp_ 
spill_claimants_cant_sue_unless_theyre_denied_b.php (Kenneth Feinberg stating “If I 
don’t find you eligible, no court will find you eligible. 
196. 33 U.S.C. § 2713(a) (2006). 
197. Id. § 2714(a). 
198. See e.g. AT&T v. Concepcion, ____ U.S. ____, 131 S.Ct. 1740, 179 L.Ed.2d 742 
(2011) (allowing corporations to include in contracts with forced arbitration clauses 
language forbidding people from taking part in class-action lawsuits). 
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parties into a role of primary responsibility for the cleanup.199 
Your company is now in that primary responsibility category 
for the Gulf. Our firm believes, however, that this legal 
“disadvantage” can serve BP purposes spectacularly by 
providing autonomy over the events on the ground. Thus, our 
firm urges you to assert immediate and sweeping authority at 
the site so that no initiative starts, no policy happens, no rules 
transpire, no press releases issue unless your company is the 
initiating authority. 
How can we dare to aspire to such a thing? The Oil Pollution 
Act of 1990 (OPA)200 was the Congressional response to the 
1989 Exxon Valdez spill and intended, in part, to extend the 
relatively longstanding “Superfund Model,” with its command 
structure and emergency response procedures, to the oil spill 
context. Responsible Parties (RP) are liable for “removal costs 
and damages” under OPA.201 In the Gulf, BP bears 
responsibility for certain “removal costs” including “the costs 
incurred” after a discharge of oil and any costs “to prevent, 
minimize, or mitigate oil pollution” from the incident.202 The 
geography of your company’s responsibility thus follows the oil 
and expands accordingly. The site of your obligation is the 
entire Gulf region impacted by the spill. The OPA imposes RP 
liability on any person owning, operating or chartering a vessel 
or facility that creates a spill, such as Deepwater Horizon.203 
There are other RPs that will be exposed through this 
litigation, but BP is in the point position, and you will see why 
that is helpful. 
1. BP as Co-Operator of the Incident Command Post 
RPs, under the National Contingency Plan (NCP), are 
preferred by the federal government to handle and fund all 
response activities while the Federal On-Scene Coordinator 
simply directs or supervises.204 As an RP, according to the 
Unified Command framework, BP not only has a foot in the 
door at the Incident Command Post, but can promote and 
                                                
199. 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a). 
200. Id. 
201. Id. 
202. Id. § 2701(31). 
203. Id. § 2701(32). 
204. 40 CFR § 300.305(c) (2010). 
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develop response actions virtually alongside the Federal On-
Scene Coordinator as part of the government’s Unified 
Command. The Coast Guard established a Unified Area 
Command⎯headquarters for the regional spill response⎯on 
April 23 in Robert, Louisiana, and will likely move it to New 
Orleans in the future. The Unified Area Command eventually 
will include representatives from the federal government, 
Louisiana, Alabama, Mississippi, Florida, Texas and BP. 
It was wise and commendable for BP to rush into their 
position within the NCP to combat this spill. When the turmoil 
is greatest, all are wondering, “Who’s in charge?” BP stepped 
up to say: “We are,” combining words with actions. This fast 
action, based on good legal advice and responsive 
management, helped to save your company from a larger legal 
disaster. The corporation should give bonuses to employees 
who thought to anticipate the organizational ramping up of the 
Coast Guard: 
[On April 22, the day the rig sank] the Coast Guard had 
established an Incident Command Post in a BP facility 
in Houma, Louisiana. BP had formed a command post 
in its corporate headquarters in Houston, Texas shortly 
after the [April 21] explosion, and the Coast Guard 
established an Incident Command Post there as well.205 
Under OPA, we believe BP is a “co-owner,” “co-operator,” 
and “co-combatant”206 in a joint enterprise to combat the oil 
spill. 
Further, the Superfund model that Congress incorporated 
into the OPA will work to BP’s advantage by allowing BP to 
take its own remedial actions and leave the larger mess to 
future happenstance. Under the Superfund laws, many of the 
RPs at various Superfund sites realized that it was virtually 
impossible to defeat EPA’s 106 orders.207 Knowing this and 
knowing that EPA could clean up the site itself and send the 
bill to the RP, many RPs undertook to do their own 
“remediation” action at their own pace, with their own 
contractors and with their own perspectives on what was 
necessary, under the watchful eye of EPA. These “voluntary” 
                                                
205. 2011 NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 9, at 130–31. 
206. Id. at 124 (photo caption); see also id. at 133–35. 
207. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act 
(CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9606 (2006). 
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cleanups are conspicuous all over the United States, and are 
typically undertaken by large companies who know that they 
would be stuck with the costs in any event. 
We advise BP, as a designated RP for the Gulf Oil Spill, to 
take over and manage the entire Gulf response action to the 
greatest extent allowed by the on-scene coordinator. This is a 
bold and sweeping initiative, but it is the best path for 
restricting and containing BP’s liabilities. We are confident 
that, together, BP and our legal team can pull it off. It is likely 
that this strategy will attract many critics,208 but we have a 
ready answer: the law requires it. OPA RP liability requires it. 
The law, in our experience, is a wonderful scapegoat and 
absorbs never-ending criticism without comment or objection. 
From this day forward, there is one and only one answer to a 
question you will often hear: “Who put BP in charge?” Your 
answer: “The law.”209 
The United States, particularly the Coast Guard, must be 
quickly incorporated into our scheme. The NCP fully 
anticipates arrangements where the federal on-scene 
coordinator supervises response activities while the RP carries 
out the duties and pays the bills. The Coast Guard always has 
the option to “federalize” the Spill, paying for the response 
with funds from the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund, and later 
seeking reimbursement from the RP.210 We do not want this to 
happen, and fortunately, neither does the Coast Guard. The 
Trust Fund is far from sufficient,211 and the Coast Guard is 
                                                
208. Compare SAFINA, supra note 18, at 53 (“We don’t normally put the criminal in 
charge of the crime scene.”) with id. at 54 (“the government keeps deferring to BP”), 
and id. at 128 (“BP is obviously a company with a lot to hide. But how it’s staged a 
coup of the Gulf and gained control of government—that, I don’t get. . . . why are any of 
our law enforcers, who should be guarding the coast against BP, so thoroughly and 
sickeningly capitulating, deferring, and letting themselves Be Played?”) (emphasis in 
original). See also Peter Baker, Obama Gives a Bipartisan Commission Six Months to 
Revise Drilling Rules, N.Y. TIMES (May 23, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/23/7s/23address.html (“At his daily briefing on 
Friday, Robert Gibbs, the White House press secretary explained repeatedly that 
current law makes the company responsible for the recovery and cleanup, not 
taxpayers.”). 
209. See SAFINA, supra note 18, at 278–80 (quoting Admiral Thad Allen, “That was 
what the law required.”). 
210. 40 CFR § 300.305(d) (2010). 
211. Compare 2011 NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 9, at 135 (MMS had 
a “lack of resources”), with id. at 135 (the “emergency reserve” available to the federal 
on-scene coordinator the day the rig exploded was $18,600,000. By Nov. 11, BP had 
paid $580, 977,461 to the federal government for response costs.). 
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unprepared in other ways for the enormous bureaucratic 
exertion a response of this size would entail.212 
This “co-combatant” outcome places BP exactly where it 
wants to be, and again the Exxon model commends itself. In 
any “partnership,” the more aggressive of the two gets to lead. 
BP must aspire to influence, and if possible, to dominate, each 
and every aspect of the response: from the definition, release 
and control of information; to the choice, order and 
configuration of technology to stop the spill; and to the 
recruitment, gearing-up, priorities, and assignments of 
cleanup crews. BP must be in charge in every sense of the 
word. This way, BP can define, contain, and limit this oil spill 
by devoting its full economic strengths to three overarching 
goals: (1) defining the spill as a “mishap;” (2) defining its 
containment as “progress” and (3) defining the cleanup as 
“proceeding according to schedule.” If BP follows our firm’s 
advice by focusing its message and implementing policies 
aggressively and consistently, the law will shift to 
accommodate these policies. 
In confidence, of course, while our firm believes 
characterizing BP as “in charge” and the “dominant partner” is 
correct and appropriate, we recommend that BP’s policy, 
beginning immediately, should be to use precise terminology 
when referring to the U.S. government and each of its 
agencies. These government actors are “partners,” “members of 
the same team,” or “co-leaders” of this enterprise. It is our 
firm’s hope that from this afternoon forward, all of BP’s major 
oil spill response policy decisions will enjoy, at least arguably, 
the “concurrence” of the U.S. government. This federal 
concurrence is important because BP must make as many 
friends as possible within the ranks of U.S. government 
agencies to ensure the company’s survival and prosperity. 
Praise, compliments, flattery, and thanks should be spread 
freely among your “partners” and “associates” within the U.S. 
government. 
It might be a good idea for BP to establish a shadow 
                                                
212. See U.S. COAST GUARD, Explosion, Fire, Sinking and Loss of Eleven Crew 
Members Aboard the Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit Deepwater Horizon in the Gulf of 
Mexico, April 20-22, 2010, Action by the Commandant (2011), available at 
http://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/cg545/dw/exhib/Volume%20I%20-%20Enclosure%20to% 
20Final%20Action%20Memo.pdf (outlining the U.S. Coast Guard’s additional actions 
to improve safety and regulatory oversight in the wake of the disaster). 
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representative for each pivotal federal official encountered. We 
want the federal version of the facts to be your version. 
Functionally, any “joint information center” should become a 
BP information center.213 Ideally, U.S. government officials 
should be knocking at BP’s door for information rather than 
the other way around.214 
2. “Proprietary” Response Efforts 
It is important for BP management and employees to 
recognize that, however unwillingly, our firm is already in 
discovery mode with respect to the many potential legal 
claims. Let us suppose that the Spill spreads to 88,000 square 
miles.215 If this occurs, our firm would seek to “control” and 
“contain” all information about the impact and its 
consequences regarding the entire Gulf: on the sea, above it, 
and under it. Your company will not be served by 
indiscriminate public scrutiny of this scene. It will not be 
served by flyovers,216 drive-bys, fortuitous sampling, 
eyewitnesses to wildlife suffering, and film of the all-too-
normal feather-bedding.217 It has been said that “safety is not 
                                                
213. On BP’s public relations efforts: 
As with the cofferdam, BP struggled with public communications surrounding the 
top kill. At the time, both industry and government officials were highly uncertain 
about the operation’s probability of success. One MMS employee estimated that 
probability as less than 50 percent, while a BP contractor said that he only gave 
the top kill a “tiny” chance to succeed. But BP’s Hayward told reporters, “We rate 
the probability of success between 60 and 70 percent.” After the top kill failed, 
that prediction may have lessened public confidence in BP’s management of the 
effort to control the well. 
2011 NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 9, at 150 (footnotes omitted). See also 
SAFINA, supra note 18, at 51 (“We will now play a game called BP Says. BP says it’ll do 
this; BP says it’ll try that; BP says it has ideas; BP says it needs a month”); id. at 105 
(quoting Admiral Allen on BP, “They are necessarily the modality by which this is 
going to get solved.”). 
214. 2011 NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 9, at 151 (footnote omitted) 
(“Most symbolically, the federal government stopped holding joint press conferences 
with BP. From June 1 on, Admiral Allen gave his own daily press briefing.”). 
215. SAFINA, supra note 18, at 266 (88,000 square miles—37% of Gulf federal 
waters—closed to fishing at the height of the spill). 
216. SAFINA, supra note 18, at 127 (“The flow BP is getting good at stopping is the 
flow of news. When folks at Southern Seaplane . . . call the local Coast Guard-Federal 
Aviation Administration command center for routine permission to fly a photographer 
. . . over part of the oily Gulf, a BP contractor answers the phone. His swift and 
absolute response: Permission denied.”). 
217. Compare 2009 PERSONAL STORIES, supra note 9, at 98 (Don Cornett, Exxon 
Public Relations Manager stating “Our operation was enormous. At the peak, as I 
recall, we had over 12,000 employees in Alaska.”), with id. at 136 (Roy Robertson, 
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proprietary,”218 but we suggest that BP implement a policy 
stating that all matters pertaining to response, cleanup, and 
damage assessment are entirely “proprietary.”219 
The “Exxon Blueprint” will be highly useful in developing 
the corporate strategy for responding to this oil spill. Like 
Exxon, BP is starting from ground zero220 and must make a 
good show of its cleanup efforts; Exxon was able to accomplish 
this by conspicuously moving bodies, and BP should follow in 
their footsteps.221 Cleanup actions may be wildly experimental 
and reckless, focusing always on that which can be seen and 
not on that which matters.222 In this way, managers of the 
cleanup enterprise can make ample use of fakes, feints and 
adjustments.223 Appearances can be cleaned up with greater 
                                                
Seldovia Resident stating that BP “just wanted to cover it up and say it was clean.”). 
218. 2011 NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 9, at 217. 
219. David Carr, A Disaster Privately Managed, N.Y. TIMES (June 14, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/14/business/media/14carr.html (discussing whether 
BP could clarify the obvious failure of the top kill and quoting a BP official, who states 
that “[g]iven recent volatility in BP share price, I’m told that information related to top 
kill is now considered stock-market sensitive, which means it has to be managed under 
disclosure rules for the London and N.Y. stock exchanges”). 
220. 2011 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 9, at 51. See also 2009 PERSONAL 
STORIES, supra note 9, at 194, 195 (Walt Parker, Chair, Alaska Oil Spill Commission 
explaining that oversight of oil shipment was “completely disregarded” after an 
adverse court decision in 1979; and state that “all the recovery equipment was buried 
under several feet of snow when the Exxon Valdez hit the reef.”). 
 221. On the clean-up efforts, John Devens Jr., Cleanup “Scrounger:” 
Most of us working on the cleanup understood right away that we were being paid 
to put on a big show. When the helicopter flew over and people saw lots of activity, 
they had no idea whether it was effective or not . . . We had been cleaning 
approximately 100 yards of beach per day, and suddenly Big Bob told us “At the 
rate you guys are going, this will take  years to clean up. From now on we’re going 
to make a quarter-mile of beach a day” . . . I started thinking about it, and there 
was only one way we were going to make that quota.  We started booming off 
clean beaches next to oiled beaches. . . we made our quota. 
2009 PERSONAL STORIES, supra note 9, at 111–13. 
222. Otto Harrison, Exxon Cleanup Manager on the clean-up efforts: 
We decided that, although we didn’t have the equipment to clean up yet, we would 
provide workers with rags and towels, and put them to work as best we could. 
Almost everyone has seen photographs in which we had hundreds of men and 
women on the shoreline, wiping off rocks with rags. 
Id. at 114–115. 
223. See, e.g. id. at 99, 100, 102 (Stan Stephens, Valdez Tour Boat Operator stating 
that “The Exxon Valdez is a perfect example of no one taking blame or responsibility”); 
Harry Allen of EPA on the use of Corexit despite its toxicity: 
Exxon had begun the beach cleaning process. When they brought in the cleaning 
agent, which was the oil dispersant Corexit, the EPA determined that it could be 
toxic to the intertidal invertebrates adjacent to the surfaces being cleaned, and the 
Regional Response Team (RRT) denied approval for its use as a surface washing 
agent. Exxon agreed to reformulate the dispersant and EPA agreed to help 
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ease and at lower cost than the reality of rocks and sand. In 
the end this “cleanup” will be conducted largely by the wind, 
the waves and the tides.224 
For the moment, though, the old friends of the industry—
boom, skimmers, dispersants and fires—will dominate cleanup 
efforts. BP’s claims of cleanup capacity have been a bit 
overwrought here, which will result in public relations issues. 
For example, in the recovery plan, BP stated it had the 
stunning capacity to remove 491,721 barrels of oil per day.225 
By our firm’s calculations, assuming a best-case scenario, BP 
might get halfway to that cleanup goal in seventy-five days.226 
BP has also laid claim to a significant mechanical recovery 
capacity, which could be true only if “significant” means 
capacity to remove less than 900 barrels per day.227 
Necessarily, BP will face other awkward moments because the 
preferred tertiary cleanup strategy (dispersants) will probably 
undercut the utility of BP’s primary (boom) and secondary 
(skimmers) cleanup techniques. Frankly, our firm knows that 
these boom and skimmers will be of little use in removing 
oil.228 
                                                
expedite its ‘relisting’ as a surface washing agent. 
Id. at 103, 104; Joe Bridgman, Public Information Officer, Alaska Dep’t of 
Environmental Conservation on Exxon’s obfuscation: 
I can’t recall the number of carcasses, but say by the middle of summer there were 
135,000 carcasses. [We actually counted them.] Exxon came out in the media, 
saying essentially, “These are only estimates.” . . . It was that kind of endless 
dissembling by Exxon that we were battling . . . Every time Exxon told a lie, we 
would respond with the truth. . . . That’s when I realized that Exxon had done the 
old bait-and-switch trick. Through studying the photographs and comparing them, 
it was a certainty that their “before” pictures were of one beach and their “after” 
pictures were of another beach. 
Id. at 118, 121–22. See also id. at 132, 134 (Charles Wohlforth, Reporter, Anchorage 
Daily News stating that “The animal rescue was another more harm than good story”). 
224. 2009 PERSONAL STORIES, supra note 9, at 106, 107 (Clyde Robbins, Vice 
Admiral, West Coast, U.S. Coast Guard stating, “One of the things that some pretty 
important people said during those meetings was that we might be better off doing 
nothing and letting Mother Nature take care of it. But doing nothing wasn’t an option, 
ever. We had to do something even if it was just looking busy.”). 
225. See FREUDENBURG & GRAMLING, supra note 7, at 14. 
226. See id. 
227. Id. 
228. Quoting Thad Allen: 
So we had eighty-five days of a different spill coming to the surface in a different 
way in a different place every day, depending on winds and current conditions. We 
had a hundred thousand different patches of oil from Louisiana to Florida.  
Because the oil spill contingency plan didn’t call for enough equipment, we were 
behind the power curve for six or seven weeks. We had three kinds of responses to 
the oil; skim it, burn it, or disperse it. 
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a. Boom 
A boom is a “floating barrier serving to obstruct 
navigation”229 and intercept oil. BP will need its own navy to 
pick up this boom, distribute it and place it where it might 
help the cleanup. Exxon saw this need in its day, recruited its 
own navy from parts unknown and from suddenly-out-of-work 
fishermen, paid them well, and put them to work on the boom 
and other matters. BP should follow the Exxon strategy by 
hiring a navy of vessels, calling it perhaps the “Vessels of 
Opportunity Program.”230 BP should ensure the mariners on 
these vessels are well-trained,231 well-dressed,232 and 
comfortable.233 Proper training should include instruction on 
the wisdom of not talking to the press.234 These mariners 
should be well paid, even if the business of the day requires 
that they sit in port. In theory, these mariners will be paid and 
                                                
SAFINA, supra note 18, at 282. See id. at 277 (“Boom is easily defeated”); id. at 245 
(quoting a worker: “every time we find a large enough mass to actually be able to do 
some productive skimming, they just hit it with dispersants.”); FREUDENBURG & 
GRAMLING, supra note 7, at 156 (emphasis in original) (“Skimmers work well with 
thick oil in swimming pools, and booms can cordon off oil spills in small ponds, if there 
is no wind.”); 2009 PERSONAL STORIES, supra note 9, at 140, 141 (“fish pump” actually 
“sucked up oil. But the minute the officials saw how well it worked, they pulled it off 
our boat and replaced it with a skimmer that could not pick up the heavy debris mixed 
with the now hardened oil.”); JACOBSEN, supra note 111, at 94 (finding that three 
percent of lost oil is skimmed, five percent is burned). 
229. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 196 (2d college ed. 1982). 
230. See 2011 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 9, at 140–41. Compare JACOBSEN, 
supra note 111, at 73 (“there were about three thousand VOOs, as everyone called 
them, operating in Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana”), with id. at 74 (“All flew the 
triangular VOO flag and all seemed to be zipping about with minimal coordination.”). 
231. On the “beauty” of training, see SAFINA, supra note 18, at 185. 
232. On the clothing requirements see: 
I notice that everyone aboard all the other boats wears a silly little orange life 
jacket, the uniform of Being Paid, even in water calm enough to reflect one’s 
tightening anger. Most professional fishermen have probably never in their lives 
worn a life jacket on a boat. But of course BP wants to ensure safety on the job. 
Unlike while drilling in mile-deep water and risks galore. 
Id. at 143. 
233. Compare id. at 160 (“If you come back here, you’d have to get a BP 
representative to come with ya. This is a BP safety area. You need a hard hat, steel-
toed shoes, safety glasses”), with id. at 189 (“It’s hot. And because it’s so hot, BP’s 
beachside cleanup workers—30,000 of them—are told to work for twenty minutes and 
rest for forty. For $12 an hour, the work is sweaty and uncomfortable, but not overly 
taxing.”). 
234. Id. at 127–28 (discussing BP’s strategy of limiting journalist’s access to 
information). 
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trained to place boom.235 In fact, boom will probably not figure 
in the outcome other than to satisfy the political cravings of 
the local parishes.236 
b. Skimmers and Controlled Burns 
Skimmers are devices for removing floating matter from 
liquid.237 Despite the boastings of increases in size, strength 
and vast capacities, skimmers will never be able to pick up 
more than a tiny fraction of spilled and dispersed oil.238 
Recovering spilled milk from the sidewalk would be easier. 
Regardless of effectiveness, BP must use the skimmers 
because there are many available and they could be of 
marginal service for burning and targeting dispersant. 
Two compelling legal reasons recommend a burn policy. One 
is that anything not burned will be hauled ashore. Once 
ashore, the collected oil will be subject to stringent and 
cumbersome laws regarding hazardous and solid waste. These 
are the lessons learned by Exxon in Prince William Sound and 
by the post-Katrina experience of the oil industry in the Gulf. 
First, a loud and angry constituency will advocate for treating 
this debris as “hazardous waste” under another federal law 
known as the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
(RCRA),239 an outcome that would shrink your disposal options 
substantially. Even were we to prevail on that point, all things 
hauled ashore would be “solid waste,”240 which triggers a 
                                                
235. 2011 COMMISSION REPORT,  supra note 9, at 141 (explaining that “[p]lacing 
boom requires skill and training, and responders differed in their judgments of how 
much the vessels contributed.”). 
236. Compare SAFINA, supra note 18, at 144 (“This boom is useless against [the oil]. 
You might as well stretch dental floss across your bathtub to hold soapy water to one 
side.”), with 2011 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 9, at 151–54, (“eye candy” for the 
observer). 
237. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1147 (2d college ed. 1982). 
238. Compare 2009 PERSONAL STORIES, supra note 9, at 185, 186 (quoting Al Burch, 
Kodiak Commercial Fisherman that “[o]nce we were able to get the oil, what do you do 
with it? There weren’t enough skimmers. The ones that were available didn’t work 
very well, once the oil got outside of Prince William Sound, because it was so thick.”), 
with JACOBSEN, supra note 111, at 94 (“That all those thousands of Vessels of 
Opportunity and professional skimming vessels had managed to skim only 3 percent of 
the oil strikes me as a debacle of the first order.”). 
239. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(5) (2006) (defining hazardous waste). 
240. Id. § 6903(27). We have asked Sen. James Inhofe to look into this matter on our 
behalf. See Superfund:  Information on the Nature and Costs of Cleanup Activities at 
Three Landfills in the Gulf Coast Region (letter to Sen. Inhofe from David C. Trimble, 
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somewhat less onerous regime of regulatory oppression. Here, 
too, we propose a “burning at sea” cleanup strategy as a way to 
get around RCRA. 
There is a second important factor that recommends a 
thorough and sweeping burning strategy. Under the 
Endangered Species Act (ESA) it is a crime to “take,” or to 
solicit another to take, any individual member of an 
endangered or threatened species.241 Similarly, it is a crime 
under the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) to engage 
in the “taking” of any marine mammal.242 Substantial 
penalties and jail time accompany a conviction. But these laws 
generally do not condemn the “taking” of carcasses, 
endangered or otherwise. Thus, debris-burning of deceased 
wildlife is not hampered by these laws. While our firm cannot 
urge BP to commit a crime, we point out that this strategy of 
“cleansing by fire” collaterally works to remove evidence of 
forbidden “takes” that may be claimed against BP. Please note 
that there is an International Convention discouraging the 
burning of wastes at sea.243 We will leave it to the State 
Department lawyers to determine whether the United States 
is violating this convention. BP certainly is not. 
c. Dispersants 
Dispersants appear to have fallen through a legal crack to 
BP’s advantage. There are several ways in which dispersants 
might have been classified that would have restricted their 
use; apparently, though, legal mechanisms have failed to 
detect their potential negative ramifications. First, the Clean 
Water Act (CWA) forbids the deliberate discharge of huge 
volumes of chemicals of unknown or poorly known ingredients 
so dispersants might have been treated as “pollutants.” If that 
had happened, the “effluent data” (knowledge on that which is 
discharged) in all likelihood would have been “available to the 
                                                
Acting Director, Natural Resources and Environment, U.S. Government 
Accountability Office) (Feb. 18, 2011) available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11 
287r.pdf. 
241. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B), (g) (2006). 
242. 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a) (2006). 
243. 1996 Protocol to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution By 
Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, As Adopted by the Special Meeting of 
Contracting Parties to the London Convention 1972 art. 5, Nov. 7, 1996 (contracting 
parties forbid “incineration at sea of wastes and other matter”). 
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public.”244 This legal path was not followed. Dispersants could 
be treated as a “chemical substance or mixture” under Section 
4 of the Toxic Substances Control Act,245 which could have 
resulted in a stringent safety and environmental testing 
regime.246 This did not happen either. Luckily for BP, the U.S. 
legal regime seems to allow the party responsible for an oil 
spill to attack it by any dispersant available, regardless of the 
hazard.247 
How did BP emerge with such a favorable outcome? Legally, 
the oil industry has managed to sidetrack and insinuate the 
use of dispersants into the command structure of the National 
Contingency Plan. The oil industry has worked for years to 
make this happen in the United States. The efforts have 
invented “precedents” around the world (hundreds of oil spills 
have been treated with dispersants) and this has yielded a 
“customary” practice embraced by nations, advisory bodies and 
“scientific” enterprises. 
Be that as it may, as we interpret the present legal 
landscape, the simple act of prelisting dispersants under the 
National Priorities List248 invites BP to use any listed product, 
                                                
244. WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW:  AIR & WATER 589 (West 
1986) (discussing Section 308(b)(2), 35 U.S.C. § 1318(b)(2) (still in effect)). 
245. 15 U.S.C. § 2603 (2006). 
246. John S. Applegate, The Government Role in Scientific Research:  Who Should 
Bridge the Data Gap in Chemical Regulation?, in WENDY WAGNER & RENA STEINZOR, 
EDS., RESCUING SCIENCE FROM POLITICS:  REGULATION AND THE DISTORTION OF 
SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH 255, 268 (Cambridge U. Press 2006); see WILLIAM H. RODGERS, 
JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: PESTICIDES AND TOXIC SUBSTANCES, 427–28 (Thomson 
West 1988) (footnotes omitted).  See also David Markell, An Overview of TSCA:  Its 
History and Key Underlying Assumptions, and Its Place in Environmental Regulation, 
32 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 333 (2010). 
247. SAFINA, supra note 18, at 197 (“taking bolt cutters to the food chain”). If people 
really are concerned about dispersants, we recommend that you bring your influence 
to bear on the Coast Guard to crack down on “cowboy” and “vigilante” usage: 
The irony reached an apotheosis worthy of Kaftka when, after its planes had 
carpet-bombed the Gulf with the world’s entire supply of Corexit, the Coast Guard 
delivered signs to Gulf Coast marinas that said “WARNING: THE USE OF SOAPS OR 
OTHER DISPERSING AGENTS TO DISSIPATE OIL IS MORE HARMFUL TO THE MARINE 
ENVIRONMENT THAN IF THE OIL HAD BEEN LEFT ALONE. USE OF THESE AGENTS 
WITHOUT THE PERMISSION OF THE CAPTAIN OF THE PORT IS AGAINST THE LAW.  YOU 
MAY BE PENALIZED UP TO $32,500 FOR EACH INCIDENT!!” 
See JACOBSEN, supra note 111, at 141. 
248. See UNDERSTANDING OIL SPILL DISPERSANTS, supra note 136, at 22 (2005) 
(describing processes for “pre-approval” and other authorizations); Helen Chapman et 
al., The use of chemical dispersants to combat oil spills at sea: A review of practice and 
research needs in Europe, 54 MARINE POLLUTION BULLETIN 827 (2007); INSTITUTE OF 
PETROLEUM, GUIDELINES ON THE USE OF OIL SPILL DISPERSANTS (2d ed. Aug. 1996). 
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trade-secret protected or not, regardless of unreasonable risk, 
available data on toxicity and effects on wildlife,249 amounts 
used250 or means applied. Frankly, we always have believed 
that the best way to hide something from the Coast Guard is to 
put it at the bottom of the sea. 
This strategy has a substantial upside—liabilities are higher 
if the oil reaches sensitive environments, lower if it is made to 
disappear, lower yet if known damage is displaced by unknown 
damage and still lower if unseen damage creeps into and 
comes to rest in never-before-researched deepwater 
environments. 
Environmentalists will criticize BP for unwarranted 
experimentation on the environment of the Gulf and its people. 
But there is no experiment because there is no baseline, no 
hypothesis, no orderly development of data and no plausible 
methodologies. BP will find, as Exxon did,251 that public-
spirited science has difficulty getting organized to investigate 
massive and far-reaching assaults on the physical 
environment. Even eye-witness accounts, normally of some 
import in law, can be dismissed as “anecdotal” in the context of 
dispersant use as these accounts are unscientific and therefore 
unreliable.252 Which dispersant product should BP use? BP can 
                                                
See also Tip Wonhoff, Chemical Dispersants & the BP Oil Spill:  Never Before Used at 
Depth, paper prepared for Law B565, U.S. Coastal & Ocean Law, Univ. of Washington 
School of Law, Spring 2010. 
249. Quoting a tugboat Captain on an aerial bombardment with dispersants: 
I don’t know if those dolphins were around for that or not. I don’t know if the 
pilots would have aborted the mission if they had spotted them in the target area. 
Probably not, I imagine. I only hope the dolphins somehow knew what was going 
to happen and got the hell out of there. I don’t even want to think about what 
would have happened to them if they didn’t. 
SAFINA, supra note 18, at 245. 
250. Compare: 
By April 30, BP has begun sending dispersants down a mile-long tube from a ship.  
Releasing such chemicals on the deep seafloor—rather than spraying them on 
surface oil—has never been done before.  It’s a secondary toxic leak, this one 
intentional, sent from above to meet the oil coming from below. 
SAFINA, supra note 18, at 54, with id. at 278 (quoting Thad Allen, “[T]wo things went 
off scale; one was the total amount of oil; the other was that when the protocols were 
written, no one envisioned injecting dispersants at depths of five thousand feet.”). 
251. 2009 PERSONAL STORIES, supra note 9, at 53, 54–55 (discussing the 
experimental use of dispersants by Exxon to clean up the Exxon Valdez spills which 
were incredibly dysfunctional and included problems such as improperly working 
nozzles, a drop on a Coast Guard crew and several unsuccessful drops). 
252. Compare SAFINA, supra note 18, at 113 (statement of Tony Hayward on worker 
safety: “Food poisoning is clearly a big issue.”), with id. at 109 (statement of Tony 
Hayward on the use of heavy drilling fluid: “[N]ever tried this before in water this 
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choose based on availability and cost, but need not consider 
environmental impact. Our firm understands that Corexit is 
available in volumes up to two million gallons.253 BP may 
proceed immediately to pour the world’s entire supply of Mr. 
Clean into the Gulf, which will significantly diminish removal 
costs. 
In sum, our firm estimates that the “removal” costs BP will 
face should not exceed one billion dollars. As a bonus, a good 
portion of this spending on removal efforts will diminish the 
overall natural resource damages because, theoretically, the oil 
is being removed and our efforts will reduce the damage to the 
natural environment. 
E. Natural Resource Damages: Squaring Things with Nature 
BP’s fifth category of liability is for natural resource 
damages (NRD). This theory of damages has been widely 
embraced by the U.S. legal system since it was introduced in 
the 1973 Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act.254 This idea 
rests firmly upon a number of fashionable and dangerous 
notions—such as polluter pays, the precautionary principle, an 
eye-for-an-eye corrective justice and “restoration” to 
baseline.255 
This so-called NRD regime threatens BP with losses of many 
billions of dollars, including “loss of use” claims, which will be 
especially daunting. There is, however, some good news, which 
is that Exxon succeeded in keeping its NRD liability under one 
                                                
deep.”) and id. at 95 (statement of Tony Hayward: “There aren’t any plumes.”) and id. 
at 89 (statement of Tony Hayward: “[N]ot our accident.”). 
253. Compare Mark Sappenfield, New Gulf Oil Spill Mystery: How Much Dispersant 
Did BP Use?, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (Aug. 1, 2010), 
http://www.csmonitor.com/Environment/2010/0801/New-Gulf-oil-spill-mystery-How-
much-dispersant-did-BP-use (One estimate: 1.8 million gallons, with 800,000 gallons 
administered on the Gulf floor.), with Jeff Goodell, The Poisoning, ROLLING STONE 
(July 21, 2010), http://www.rolingstone.com/politics/news/17390/183349 (The Corexit 
board includes several veterans of the oil industry.). 
254. VALERIE ANN LEE & P.J. BRIDGEN, THE NATURAL RESOURCE DAMAGE 
ASSESSMENT DESKBOOK 9 (2002) (citing Pub. L. No. 93-153, tit. II, 87 Stat. 584 (1973) 
(codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1651–65). Under this Act, the holder of the 
pipeline right-of-way was made “strictly liable to all damaged parties, public or 
private, without regard to fault for such damages, and without regard to ownership of 
any affected lands, structures, fish, wildlife, or biotic or other natural resources relied 
upon by Alaska Natives, Native organizations, or others for subsistence or economic 
purposes.” 
255. See generally id. 
56
Washington Journal of Environmental Law & Policy, Vol. 1, Iss. 2 [2011], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjelp/vol1/iss2/1
2011] STRANGER THAN FICTION 275 
 
billion dollars.256 It has still been kept on the defensive, 
though—mostly as a result of its acceptance of the so-called 
“reopener clause” in its 1991 NRD settlement.257 
Exxon was obliged to confront the 1977 Amendments to the 
Clean Water Act,258 which said that the trustees can recover 
the costs of “replacing or restoring” lost natural resources.259 
BP is now up against the ghost of the Clean Water Act, which 
shows up conspicuously in the Oil Pollution Act’s (OPA) 
“measure of damages.”260 It considers: 
A. the cost of restoring, rehabilitating, replacing, or 
acquiring the equivalent of, the damaged natural 
resources; 
B. the diminution in value of those natural resources 
pending restoration; plus 
C. the reasonable cost of assessing those damages.261 
Measuring damages by the “cost of restoring” is the clearest 
example of a Congressional purpose to protect “nature’s 
baseline” from unwelcome assault. The process of NRD focuses 
on corrective justice; that is, putting things back the way they 
were before the event occurred and compensating for losses 
that take place between the injury and the restoration. The 
statutory terms of “restoring, rehabilitating, replacing” frame a 
wounded nature nursed back to health. The deed of “acquiring 
the equivalent” declares casualties should be redressed by 
recruitment and replacement with new personnel. Together 
these terms, dangerously, constitute the boldest of pledges to a 
natural world: “We will protect you as if these vandals were 
never here.” 
This NRD law is a righteous and reckless retribution 
machine. Our firm will endeavor to protect BP from being run 
over by it. The good news is that this dangerous NRD weapon 
                                                
256. The Exxon Valdez Reopener, supra note 20, at 149. 
257. See Rhonda McBride, ExxonMobil in $93M Battle Over Unforeseen Damages in 
1989 Spill, KTUU.COM (November 13, 2011), http://www.ktuu.com/news/ktuu-exxon-
in-a-93-million-dollar-battle-over-unforseen-damages-in-1989-spill-20111115,0,63740 
25.story; William Yardley, 22 Years Later, the Exxon Valdez Case is Back in Court, 
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 3, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/04/us/04 exxon.html (on 
the “reopener”). 
258. Clean Water Act § 311(b)(3), 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(3) (2006). 
259. Id. § 1321(f)(5). 
260. Id. § 2706(d)(1)(A)–(C). 
261. Id. 
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has been narrowed and blunted with the passage of time. Two 
major rulemakings have gone down the NRD road262 and U.S. 
industry lawyers have succeeded in snatching back some of 
what appeared to have been ceded away by these dangerous 
acts of Congress. For example, OPA regulations define “injury” 
as “an observable or measurable adverse change in a natural 
resource or impairment of a natural resource service.”263 
Further, to establish injury trustees must determine whether 
there is: 
• Exposure, a pathway, and an adverse change to a 
natural resource or service as a result of an actual 
discharge; or 
• An injury to a natural resource or impairment of a 
natural resource service as a result of response 
actions or a substantial threat of a discharge. 
To proceed with restoration planning, trustees also 
quantify the degree, and spatial and temporal extent of 
injuries. Injuries are quantified by comparing the 
condition of the injured natural resources or services to 
baseline, as necessary.264 
These definitions alone would defeat many natural resource 
damage claims. Injury does not happen in the NRD framework 
unless the loss is observable or measurable. It is rarely either 
one.265 Nature is notoriously uncooperative in these 
calculations.  Determing “exposure, a pathway, and adverse 
change” might work for an auto accident, but the tactic is 
unlikely to work well for sensitive ecological damage. Life in 
the ocean is an evolutionary process, not a stable state, which 
makes change inevitable and judgments about the “adverse” 
direction informed guesses. Also, remember this “adverse 
                                                
262. LEE & BRIDGEN, supra note 254, ch. 10 (discussing content of both CERCLA 
and OPA natural resource damage assessment (NRDA) regulations). 
263. 15 C.F.R. § 990.30 (2010) (emphasis added). 
264. NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION, INJURY ASSESSMENT:  
GUIDANCE DOCUMENT FOR NATURAL RESOURCE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT UNDER THE OIL 
POLLUTION ACTION OF 1990 1–4 (1996). 
265. E.g., Susan Milius, Scientists Try to Identify and Track Elusive Larvae in a 
Boundless Ocean, SCIENCE NEWS, Jan. 15, 2011, at 19 (explaining the difficulties of 
studying larvae that are “mere squiggles of still-developing tissue,” are “fiendishly 
hard to identify,” “don’t carry a lot of diagnostic characteristics,” look like “cartoon 
aliens,” “are more like dandelion fluff blowing in the wind,” have to survive as “bite-
sized nuggets in open water,” disperse widely and proceed unnoticed by “typical 
monitoring programs”). 
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change” must present itself “as a result of an actual discharge.” 
This little qualifier of causation hides a squadron of defenses 
dressed up as cause in fact or proximate cause. Exxon beat the 
rap for its destruction of the herring fishery with a version of a 
cause-in-fact defense.266 And “proximate cause,” of course, is an 
open-ended defense allowing wrong-doers to walk away from 
any consequences deemed “surprising” to narrow-minded 
human beings.267 
1. Proximate Cause Defenses 
For restoration planning, the law requires a “quantification” 
of the injury and a comparison to the “baseline.” Corporate 
polluters such as BP can only relish the opportunity to contest 
these factors. Baselines for comparison rarely exist, and in all 
probability none exist at all for BP spill-impacted species in 
the Gulf of Mexico. Just what were the baseline populations for 
the world’s largest fish (the whale sharks), its most valuable 
(the Bluefin tuna), or the Kemps’ Ridley sea turtle or the 
brown pelican? 
In a wonder of proven wonders, the Commonwealth of 
Puerto Rico once established that an oil spill caused the 
decline of 4,605,486 organisms per acre.268 This calculation was 
achieved by surveys of oiled and unoiled areas. The damage 
was not “observable,” but it presumably was “measurable.” 
With twenty acres affected, this meant that a grand total of 
92,109,720 marine animals were killed by the SS Zoe 
                                                
266. Compare Sanne Knudsen, A Precautionary Tale: Assessing Ecological Damages 
After the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, 7 U. ST. THOMAS L. J. 95 (2009), with Dr. Stanley D. 
Rice, Persistence, Toxicity, and Long-Term Environmental Impact of the Exxon Valdez 
Oil Spill, 7 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 55 (2009). 
267. Compare General Elec. Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 128 F.3d 767, 776–77, 
779 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (refusing to accept the government’s argument that a “trustee” 
could meet its proof requirement merely by demonstrating “injury,” “exposure,” and a 
“pathway.” A “causation” defense appears to be in order.), with: 
NOAA’s brief conceded that “[t]he trustee must establish causation to the 
satisfaction of the district court,” a position the agency reiterated during oral 
argument, while also acknowledging that this interpretation of the final rule 
would bind the agency in any future proceedings. The court expressly adopted 
NOAA’s construction of its final rule that the trustee must “prove causation.” 
Craig H. Allen, Proving Natural Resource Damage Under OPA 90: Out with the 
Rebuttable Presumption, in with APA-Style Judicial Review?, 85 TULANE L. REV. 1039, 
1052 (2011) (footnotes omitted). 
268. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. SS Zoe Colocotroni, 628 F.2d 652, 660–661 (1st 
Cir. 1980). 
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Colocotroni oil spill that precipitated the study.269 But 
remember, any change must be adverse, and who is to say that 
fewer mollusks and more polychaete is an “adverse” outcome 
for an ecological condition?  
The “exposure,” “pathway,” and “adverse injury” must occur 
“as a result of an actual discharge.” Here hide the mysteries of 
causation. Restoration planning requires quantification “by 
comparing the condition of the injured natural resource” to the 
“baseline.” We will happily contest this elusive “baseline.” Any 
“quantification” is an invitation to an argument—an argument 
that our firm expects to win. In Zoe itself, the court of appeals 
disapproved—much to our delight—a very clever valuation 
technique that assigned a loss of at least six cents to each and 
every organism killed.270 
Frankly, the members of our firm are licking our chops to 
defend BP in this NRD context. We expect ours to be the first 
case where the court acknowledges that the spill killed billions 
of organisms271 but that no “injury” occurred. The happy 
outcome in the Zoe case leaves our firm wondering whether the 
courts might disapprove any and all attempts to attach 
economic value to larvae or phytoplankton in the ocean. In 
2007, the U.S. Supreme Court did not even blink over the 
                                                
269. See id. at 677 (disagreeing with the testimony of the expert economist that 
valued each organism at six cents for total replacement costs of $5,526,583 (0.06 x 
92,109,720)). 
270. See id. at 661. 
271. Compare: 
[T]here must have been—I speculate—tremendous damage to sheer numbers of 
those eggs and larvae. We should also bear in mind, however, that the numbers of 
eggs and larvae are always far in excess of what the system can support. The 
competition and struggle for existence is so intense that under normal, healthy 
circumstances, only one fish egg in millions wins the lottery ticket for becoming an 
adult. There is where a lot of the resiliency comes from. There may be enough 
survivors to let the Gulf recover quickly. 
SAFINA, supra note 18, at 250-251, with: 
Early on we got ships out there to get baseline data of things like plankton and 
Bluefin tuna larvae—as much as possible. When this disaster happened, just-
spawned shrimp and crabs and fish were in the drifting plankton. The plankton, I 
think, could have been very seriously affected. Something like eighty to ninety 
percent of the economically important fish populations in the Gulf depend on the 
marshes and estuaries for part of their lives; they move back and forth. For them, 
this could not have come at a worse time. But it’s next to impossible to 
document—so far—what’s happened to them . . . We won’t know for a while—we 
really won’t know for decades—but it’s likely it’s had very serious impacts. 
Id. at 283–84 (quoting Jane Lubchenco). This last comment—from a world-class 
biologist of considerable renown—makes us think twice about the wisdom of an Exxon-
like reopener in our NRD settlement. 
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Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) failure to ascribe 
any value at all to billions of fish (both juveniles and adults) 
lost in the course of utility use of cooling water.272 Precedents 
such as Zoe and Entergy—that push living things to the 
precipice of worthless—are formidable tools for disarming the 
risks of NRD. 
Despite these legal precedents, we do not expect the U.S. 
government to acquiesce meekly in these assertions of 
“worthlessness” or “causation not proven.” The U.S. 
government will attach plausible values to all things lost, 
including larvae. It will fight furiously, in a focused but 
comprehensive way, to link our spill to detrimental declines in 
natural resources. Predictably, two phases of proof will be 
unfurled to establish that an injury is compensable from a 
causation standpoint. The first, often termed general 
causation, requires proof that the toxic substance can cause an 
adverse effect—particularly the disease or injury in question. 
The government must then prove the specific injury was 
distinguishable from the background incidence of injury or 
disease and therefore could be causally attributed to exposure 
specifically from BP’s oil. This is often termed specific 
causation. This distinction and the need to prove both is a 
central object in both NRD and all toxic torts and will be a 
great focus for defense—the Gulf of Mexico is full of other 
people’s oil beside our own.273 
We caution you also against expecting too much from the 
“finger-pointing” defenses suggested by the celebrated 
language in OPA (“result[ing] from”)274 and Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 
(CERCLA) (no “double recovery,” no recovery for damages 
occurring “wholly before”).275 There is a similar formulation in 
                                                
272. See Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208 (2009); see also DOUGLAS 
A. KYSAR, REGULATING FROM NOWHERE:  ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND THE SEARCH FOR 
OBJECTIVITY 224 (2010) (“In the EPA’s Phase II rulemaking . . . literally billions of fish 
each year were simply ignored by the agency’s economic analysis, treated as if their 
loss was meaningless because the question of their worth had been abandoned.”). 
273. LEE & BRIDGEN, supra note 254, AT 201. See also Steve C. Gold, How Genomic 
Information Should, and Should Not, Change Toxic Tort Causation, 34 HARV. ENVTL. 
L. REV. 371 n.4 (2010) (finding that the plaintiff must prove both, but “court’s ultimate 
focus” is proof that individual plaintiff’s disease was caused by exposure) (internal 
citations omitted). 
274. 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a) (2006). 
275. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f) (2006), with 33 U.S.C. § 2706(d)(3) (OPA 
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the NRDA rules on the background presence of injury.276 It is 
true that these legal fragments support a defense of “somebody 
else did it.” But the usual suspects that are mentioned, e.g. 
historic destruction of wetlands, Katrina, the infamous dead 
zone, fishing mismanagement, even climate change, can be 
distinguished without serious difficulty from oiling injuries. 
On the important topic of quantification of environmental 
damage that the NRD rules require,277 the industry has 
succeeded in limiting two of the best techniques that claimants 
have developed. One is the highly creative “body count” 
technique applied in Zoe,278 where every creature killed would 
cost no less than six cents. The other is the highly popular 
contingent valuation technique where people are asked how 
much they would pay to protect a particular resource. This 
technique promised to inflate our liabilities to the point of the 
unbearable.279 Courts have said that agencies can use the 
“contingent valuation technique”280 but the industry continues 
to criticize this valuation method. We expect to keep the 
memory of Zoe alive and the threat of contingent valuation at 
bay. 
2. The Myth of Restoration Planning 
We will not rehash the deficiencies identified in the stacked-
up contingency plans and the oil spill response plans.281 These 
kinds of “get ready for something” plans are fanciful and 
hypothetical. Planning failed in the Exxon case.282 Congress 
                                                
prohibition on “double recovery”). 
276. 43 C.F.R. § 11.16(d) (2010) (establishing that “damages or assessment costs 
may only be recovered once, for the same discharge or release and natural resource”). 
277. Id. § 11.70–.73 (describing Type B Procedures). 
278. See Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. SS Zoe Colocotroni, 628 F.2d 652, 661 (1st 
Cir. 1980) (disapproving the Zoe technique). 
279. Brian R. Binger, Robert Copple & Elizabeth Hoffman, Contingent Valuation 
Methodology in the Natural Resource Damage Regulatory Process: Choice Theory and 
the Embedding Phenomenon, 35 NAT. RES. J. 443 (1995). 
280. General Elec. Co. v. Dep’t of Commerce, 128 F.3d 767, 772–74 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
281. See John Adams Hodge, How Environmental Regulators Can Address Human 
Factors in Oil Spill Prevention Using Crew Resource Management, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. 
11048 (2010); Denis Binder, Emergency Action Plans: A Legal and Practical Blueprint 
“Failing to Plan is Planning to Fail,” 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 791 (2002). 
282. Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Learning from Disasters: Twenty-One Years After the 
Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, Will Reactions to the Deepwater Horizon Blowout Finally 
Address the Systemic Flaws Revealed in Alaska?, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. 11041 (Nov. 2010). 
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fixed the failure in the 1990 OPA,283 only to have the failure 
fail again in the context of the Deepwater Horizon.284 
These failures are of no concern. The old military view, that 
no plan survives contact with the enemy, is widely subscribed 
to in the oil industry. So far as our firm is concerned, short of 
deliberate misstatements, BP may put anything it wishes in 
its plans—so long as the plans are solemn, dutiful and 
plausible. 
Contingency plans are all about a “good story,” and good 
stories can stray into the realm of the hypothetical or fictional. 
No doubt some commission of the future will wag its finger at 
the BP planning efforts. 285 BP should second this motion; it 
should deplore its own efforts, flail its own lapses, pledge to try 
harder, regret the shortcomings that occurred and insist that 
company planning will drastically improve. These claims 
might be exaggerations but the soft law of corporate planning 
does not care. 
Now the U.S. government does some planning too, and BP is 
free to take an entirely different view of this planning. Under 
OPA, for example, government trustees shall develop a “plan 
for the restoration, rehabilitation, replacement, or acquisition 
of the equivalent of the natural resources under their 
trusteeship.” 286 BP’s response plan is a paper exercise, while 
the government’s is a solemn contract. BP’s plan can be filed 
and forgotten, but the U.S. plan will be remembered and 
enforced to the letter of the law. 
Thus, when it comes to the restoration plan to fix what went 
wrong, the law has a sharper vision. Due process rushes to aid 
industry. Trustees must trudge up the hill of NEPA 
compliance, public participation, cost-effectiveness and 
consideration of reasonable alternatives so long as they are not 
excessively protective287 and so long as they embrace the do-
                                                
283. See 2011 NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 9, at 197 (stating that 
“[p]eople have plan fatigue . . . they’ve been planned to death.”). 
284. Id. 
285. See e.g. id. at vii, ix (stating that “a series of identifiable mistakes . . . 
systematic failures in risk management that . . . place in doubt the safety culture of 
the entire industry . . . [N]either industry nor government adequately addressed these 
risks . . . shortcomings in the joint public-private response to an overwhelming spill 
and concluding that “[b]oth government and industry failed to anticipate and prevent 
this catastrophe, and failed again to be prepared to respond to it.”). 
286. 33 U.S.C. § 2706(c)(1)(C) (2006) (emphasis added). 
287. 43 C.F.R. § 11.82(b)(iii) (2010) (providing under CERCLA, alternatives “are 
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nothing alternative of “natural recovery.”288 Restoration cannot 
happen without restoration objectives specific to the injury and 
a way of measuring success.289 There are prohibitions on 
double recovery and restrictions on using “option” and 
“existence” values.290 For the faint of heart who call this a 
“double standard,” it is. The great corporations of the world 
must be free to change and innovate. From our perspective, 
governments are most useful when they are chained, limited 
and hobbled by law. 
One of the great achievements for industry in this context is 
the invention of a new category of wildlife—“doomed” 
resources. Government planners must consider the ability of 
the resources to recover.291  If the resources cannot recover and 
there is no plan for rehabilitation or restoration that could aid 
the process, as in the case of one pod of killer whales following 
the Exxon spill,292 the population will be “doomed” and 
forgotten. If there is no plan for recovery there will be no 
industry liability. 
3. Trustees 
Third parties—notably the “joint” trustees and “outside” 
scientists—will influence the outcome on NRD. BP must have 
strategies for dealing with these third parties. The U.S. 
government is stuck with the “coordination” duty under the 
OPA regulations,293 and BP should be more than happy with 
                                                
limited to those actions” that restore natural resources or services “to no more than 
their baseline”). 
288. 15 C.F.R. § 990.53(b)(2) (2010) (stating that under the OPA, “[t]rustees must 
consider a natural recovery alternative in which no human intervention would be 
taken to directly restore injured natural resources and services to baseline”). 
289. Id. § 990.55(b)(2) (“When developing the Draft Restoration Plan, Trustees must 
establish restoration objectives that are specific to the injuries.  These objectives 
should clearly specify the desired outcome, and the performance criteria by which 
successful restoration will be judged. . . .”). 
290. Compare id. § 990.22 (double recovery), with 40 CFR § 11.83(c)(iii) (second-best 
treatment of option and existence values). 
291. 43 C.F.R. § 11.82(d)(7). 
292. 2009 PERSONAL STORIES, supra note 9, at 203, 205 (quoting Craig Matkin, 
Marine Biologist and Homer Resident after seven animals were lost from the AB pod 
and eleven from the AT-1 transient group: “now we realize that this group of 
transients may not recover and they’re probably headed for extinction.”). 
293. See 15 C.F.R. § 990.14 (2010) (describing the coordination duty of trustees: 
“[f]or joint assessments, trustees must designate one or more Lead Administrative 
Trustee(s) to act as coordinators); see also NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC 
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this state of affairs. BP is on plausible legal grounds to 
encourage—and close—any number of side deals it chooses to 
make with individual state trustees. BP must work overtime to 
undercut the “coordination” promised by the OPA regulations. 
Latecomers may be fruitfully caught in our trap of “double 
recovery.” Our firm will certainly argue “double recovery” at 
every opportunity. 
Will our strategy of rewarding defectors turn against BP if it 
agrees to pay for some hare-brained scheme that has no hope 
of helping a single fish or blade of grass in the Gulf of Mexico? 
This worst-case scenario already has occurred (some are 
calling it Jindal’s Folly), as Governor Bobby Jindal now 
petitions BP “to get his one hundred miles of sand berms 
built.”294 Our firm’s legal position must be that BP cannot be 
expected to distinguish between valid and invalid demands 
coming from a legally sanctioned trustee. That is, if the federal 
government does not say “No” in a timely manner, BP has 
every right to consider this silence a “Yes” and to offset the 
costs against the collective NRD responsibilities of the joint 
trustees. 
BP must fully understand that this policy of separate deals 
with individual trustees can lead to the collapse and 
undermining of any collective effort, which will have its 
greatest force on the topic of NRD. Frankly, we believe that 
“divide and conquer” is a least-cost alternative for BP. We 
recommend this strategy to help curtail both response costs 
and liability for NRD.295 
There is a huge risk, however, in the pursuit of any “divide 
                                                
ADMINISTRATION, PREASSESSMENT PHASE: GUIDANCE DOCUMENT FOR NATURAL 
RESOURCE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT UNDER THE OIL POLLUTION ACT OF 1990, THE 
DAMAGE ASSESSMENT REMEDIATION AND RESTORATION PROGRAM APP. J-1 (1996), 
available at http://www.darrp.noaa.gov/library/pdf/PPD_AP-J.PDF. 
294. SAFINA, supra note 18, at 271. 
BP has agreed to pay a hefty $360 million for them. But the Environmental 
Protection Agency is urging the Army Corps of Engineers to turn down the state’s 
sand berm project, saying berms don’t do anything and can harm wildlife. 
Ostensibly they’re to stop oil from contaminating shores and marshlands. Using a 
May permit, the state spent tens of millions of dollars to build four miles of berms 
. . . I suspect that this desire for berms stems from a fear of hurricanes, not oil. Is 
my suspicion misplaced? Says Grand Isle’s mayor, “What is wrong with us 
dredging and building these islands back up?” 
Id. 
295. Compare SAFINA, supra note 18, at 278 (Admiral Allen speaks of “the social and 
political nullification” of the NCP), with id. at 201 (“Unified Command, my 
[expletive].”). 
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and conquer” strategy. Absent a U.S. sign-off, the federal 
government will simply say that these “side deals” are part of 
the “response costs,” not a part of NRD. That is a powerful 
argument—probably a successful one—so “divide and conquer” 
might succeed only if BP chooses to pay for it. We do not know 
now where courts might draw the line between “restoration” 
costs (for NRD purposes) and “removal” or “response” costs (for 
cleanup purposes) but we do not expect any favors for BP in 
the formulation of the U.S. legal strategy. 
There is one conspicuous exception to our advice to work out 
separate deals with trustees. This exception applies to the 
Indian tribes. BP should not deal with them in any manner, 
shape or form. Our firm realizes that the tribes are formally 
incorporated into the structure of these NRD laws,296 but we 
hope that none are sufficiently recognized to come against BP 
in the Gulf.297 In previous litigation, our firm has confronted 
tribes and has found them to be skillful and resilient 
adversaries. They are not prone to the quick deals and ready 
buyoffs that make state and local governments so shamefully 
compliant. Some of the tribes actually see more in nature than 
the usual dollars, and they are slow to give it up. We are 
serious about this: we believe that other great corporations 
have been bankrupted by the environmental concerns of 
various tribes, and that the tribes should not be 
underestimated.298 BP should know this especially, because 
one of the “country” lawyers who worked on the Coeur d’Alene 
case was the same fellow, Ray Givens, who caught BP earlier 
this year in a devious series of lease violations on an allotment 
owned by Alaska Natives.299 
                                                
296. 33 U.S.C. § 2706(a)(3) (2006) (NRD liability “to an Indian tribe for natural 
resources belonging to, managed by, controlled by, or appertaining to such Indian 
tribe.”). 
297. See 15 C.F.R. § 990.30 (2010) (defining “Indian tribe” as a tribe that is 
“recognized”). Compare JACOBSEN, supra note 111, at ch. 2 (“The Last Hunter-
Gatherers in America”) with id. at ch. 8 (“The Last Days of Isle De Jean Charles”) 
(Biloxi-Chitimacha Indians; Pointe-au-Chien tribe). 
298. See Clifford J. Villa, Superfund v. Mega-Sites: The Coeur d’Alene River Basin 
Story, 28 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 255 (2003). 
299. See Oenga v. United States, 96 Fed. Cl. 479 (2010), on reconsideration in part, 
97 Fed. Cl. 80 (2011) (Firestone, J.). 
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4. Dealing with the Science 
The science of the matter will significantly influence the 
extent of BP’s liability and any wrong results will be 
financially painful to BP. Studies are likely gearing up to 
measure “harm” to the Gulf and its creatures, and these 
studies will probably be adverse to BP’s interests. Fortunately, 
many great corporations—tobacco, chemical, and oil companies 
among them—have developed sophisticated strategies for 
managing the business risks brought on by scientific findings. 
BP need not be a passive recipient of science. Instead, it can 
actively influence the origins, development and content of 
these studies. Additionally, BP can take an active role in 
shaping public perceptions of the results. The leading playbook 
on the topic identifies useful corporate strategies to shape, 
hide, attack and package science. 300 
One of the major categories of behavior for influencing the 
content and reach of controversial science is described, 
uncharitably, as “harassing scientists” and the “art of 
bullying.”301 Our firm prefers to call this activity “employing 
legal tools to probe the content of careless science that could do 
damage to business enterprise.” Once again, Exxon set the 
standard for this brilliantly nefarious practice. Exxon targeted 
Steve Picou, a sociologist from the University of South 
Alabama, who studied the social effects of the Exxon Valdez 
spill—surely a topic of interest to would-be litigants. Exxon 
subpoenaed Mr. Picou in an attempt to determine whether this 
research was objective and impartial. Picou explains: 
Exxon wanted every original survey with names and 
addresses, plus every scrap of information that we had 
accumulated over four years of studying the social 
impacts of the spill. They claimed they wanted the 
information in order to check the statistical analysis we 
                                                
300. MCGARITY & WAGNER, supra note 137, at 61, 97, 128, 181. We are looking into 
who said this, why, and under what conditions: “[A] federal panel of about fifty experts 
recommends continued use of chemical dispersants, saying populations of the 
underwater animals likely to be killed have a better chance of rebounding quickly than 
birds and mammals on the shoreline.” See SAFINA, supra note 18, at 114–15.   We, of 
course, are of the opinion that BP is free of NRD liability for losses of underwater 
animals whose populations rebound quickly. They are already recovered. See generally 
Charles L. Franklin, Dispersant Scrutiny Mirrors Larger Debate Over U.S. Chemical 
Control Policy, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. 11142 (Nov. 2010). 
301. MCGARITY & WAGNER, supra note 137, at 157. 
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had conducted and published in peer-reviewed journals, 
which showed irrefutably that the social impacts were 
extremely severe. 
We had to provide copies of all our information, 
including travel requests, travel reimbursement, and 
food receipts. They even subpoenaed the faxes we had 
used to communicate with our colleagues for sharing 
information. It was absolutely ludicrous. Those nine 
months of probings totally stopped the project and 
completely disrupted the university’s sociology 
department.302 
Professor Picou added, “I made the decision that, if need 
be—if ultimately I was ordered to—I would go to jail rather 
than expose my respondents. Exxon was not getting our 
confidential data.”303 He did not go to jail. The court handed 
down a split decision but he learned a lesson about becoming 
involved in the lawsuits of oil companies. 
The Picou incident was so inspiring that it is was widely 
emulated, including a long and delicate political campaign to 
discredit Michael Mann, the creator of the so-called “hockey 
stick graph” on climate change.304 This method has been 
adopted and approved of by law under the Data Access Act,305 
which obliges federally-funded scientists whose work is used to 
“inform or support” regulation to turn over their data and 
records under the Freedom of Information Act.306 Mess with 
us, industry always has said, and we will mess with you. 
BP has many options for combating the science storm 
gathering in the Gulf. Our firm recommends immediately 
buying or shaping science and hiding valid science by infecting 
it with confidentiality clauses. The first tactic should cost no 
more than fifty million dollars and consists of acquiring the 
services of an entire academic department devoted to oceans 
and ocean life.307 Tactic two is more expensive—perhaps 
                                                
302. 2009 PERSONAL STORIES, supra note 9, at 273–74 (Steve Picou, Sociologist, 
University of South Alabama). 
303. Id. at 274. 
304. MCGARITY & WAGNER 137, supra note , at 275–78. 
305. Data Access Act of Oct. 21, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681-495 
(1998). 
306. Id. 
307. JACOBSEN, supra note 111, at 78 (stating that “[i]n addition to the Vessels of 
Opportunity program, BP launched what I think of as the Scientists of Opportunity 
program.”). 
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costing $500 million—and requires pledging this large sum for 
a ten-year research program managed by an expert panel, 
open to all comers, apparently with no strings attached. Such a 
program will certainly impress: 
Rather, to its credit, I grudgingly admit, BP releases 
$25 million of a pledged half billion dollars over ten 
years to support several universities’ research into the 
effects of the blowout. To make recommendations on 
which institutions will receive funds, BP appoints an 
expert panel chaired by environmental microbiologist 
Rita Colwell, who formerly headed the National Science 
Foundation and is now a distinguished professor at 
Johns Hopkins University.308 
BP would run few risks from employing this exercise. Any 
contract that goes out will contain the usual clauses on BP 
data “ownership,” reservations on “review of data” and 
“permission to publish.” These clauses will leave BP in 
complete control. It is our firm’s experience that most 
university scientists, particularly in the biological sciences, 
could care less about these sorts of constraints. They want to 
get on with their work and avoid legal technicalities. Legal 
help from universities to faculties is desultory at best, which 
means that as a practical matter few scientists will question 
these limitations. Those that do can reject BP monies “on 
principle”—and be the poorer for it. In most cases these 
clauses will be ignored and forgotten, but we like them because 
they enable us to “pull the plug” on particularly obnoxious or 
dangerous researchers, such as a Steve Picou or a Michael 
Mann. 
As soon as the flow of oil stops, BP must turn to a general 
strategy of “packaging science.” BP must speak glowingly of 
the recuperative powers of nature, underscore how concerns 
were greatly overstated, and explain how wildlife has learned 
to live with petroleum that always was extant in the natural 
environment. The U.S. government, understandably, will be 
anxious to express any “not-as-bad-as-we-feared” sentiments. 
Knowing this, BP must be ready to exploit any windows of 
opportunity that might occur.309 Our firm is in the business of 
                                                
308. SAFINA, supra note 18, at 170. 
309. See generally SAFINA, supra note 18, at 246–51 (reporting on the saga of “What 
Happened to the Oil?” and the White House misstatements on the topic); JACOBSEN, 
supra note 111, at 93 (Browner displaying “a sort of medieval understanding of 
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collecting every official government utterance that can be 
interpreted as downplaying, minimizing or “taking the 
optimistic view” on long-term environmental consequences. All 
of this is potentially serviceable as admissions to contradict the 
trustees’ eventual calculations of natural resource damages, 
which will not be compatible with BP’s downplaying, 
minimizing and optimism. 
When the excitement subsides and the smoke settles, BP 
will retreat to Exxon’s strategy—repeated, insistent and varied 
denial of any long-term effects from the spill. Through 
extended focus on public relations, BP’s voice will continue to 
be heard as the others drop away. 
5. Liability Under Wildlife Laws 
Finally, federal wildlife laws, particularly the Endangered 
Species Act (ESA), which is often extolled for its harshness, 
may play a role in BP’s liability. In the bigger picture, the 
shreds of life of which we speak do not really matter because 
the dollars are small and the legal risks quite tolerable. 
Nonetheless, many people think much of these symbolic laws, 
and they should be addressed with tender professional care. 
We reiterate that BP had the fortuitous “foresight” to place 
its spill, and the dispersants that cheered it along, into 
completely unstudied and unknown “wilderness” regions of the 
deep Gulf: 
[U]nlike past insults, this one spewed into the depths of 
the ocean, the bathypelagic zone (3,300–13,000 feet 
deep). Despite the cold, constant darkness and high 
pressure (over 150 atmospheres), scientists know that 
the region has abundant and diverse marine life. There 
are cold-water corals, fish, and worms that produce 
light like fireflies to compensate for the perpetual night. 
Bacteria, mussels, and tubeworms have adapted to life 
in an environment where oil, natural gas, and methane 
seep from cracks in the seafloor. Endangered sperm 
whales dive to this depth and beyond to feed on giant 
squid and other prey.310 
                                                
biology”); John Collins Rudolf, Scientists Back Early Government Report on Gulf Spill, 
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 23, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/24/science/earth/24spill 
.html (agreeing that nature and technology had largely done their job). 
310. 2011 NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 9, at 174. We are reminded of 
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This BP Oil “disaster” will leave few footprints because it 
occurred mostly in parts unknown. We enclose for BP’s library 
a copy of the ten-years-in-the-making, first-ever global ocean 
Census of Marine Life.311 This census combined the work of 
over 2000 scientists from eighty-two nations. It is filled with 
behind-the-scenes stories and breathtaking photographs. In 
this deep marine environment, this oil spill could render a 
species extinct before it is named or known. Philosophers will 
talk about this for years. But there will be no legal liability. 
Of the many water classification schemes operative in the 
Gulf, two are of potential concern—“essential fish habitat” 
under the Magnuson-Stevens Act312 and “critical habitat” 
under the ESA.313 Preliminarily, it seems that BP successfully 
assailed “essential fish habitat.”314 
Try as we might, we see nothing in this ominous 
classification scheme that forbids private parties from 
entering, damaging or destroying “essential fish habitat.”315 
“Critical habitat” has a richer legal history than does 
“essential fish habitat.”316 With a number of subtle variations, 
“critical habitat” is a specified geography “essential to the 
conservation of the species” that “may require special 
management considerations or protection.”317 The dreaded 
Section 7(a)(2) of the ESA states that each federal agency must 
insure that its action “is not likely to jeopardize” a listed 
                                                
the pioneers on the Oregon Trail who abandoned their broken-down pianos and dead 
horses in the “wilderness” where nobody could see them. 
311. DARLENE TREW CRIST, GAIL SCOWCROFT & JAMES M. HARDING, JR., WORLD 
OCEAN CENSUS:  A GLOBAL SURVEY OF MARINE LIFE (2009). 
312. 16 U.S.C. § 1802(10) (2006). 
313. Id. § 1532(5). 
314. 2011 NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 9, at 178 (footnotes omitted). 
315. See 16 U.S.C. § 1802(10) (defining “essential fish habitat” as “those waters and 
substrate necessary to fish for spawning, breeding, feeding or growth to maturity”). 
The Councils are supposed to “minimize to the extent practicable adverse effects on 
such habitat caused by fishing . . .  .”  Id. § 1853(a)(7).  So far as we know, BP wasn’t 
“fishing” on April 21, 2010, and the constraint is not enforceable against third parties.  
See JOSEPH J. KALO ET AL., COASTAL AND OCEAN LAW:  CASES & MATERIALS 481–84 (3d 
ed. 1999). 
316. See Kieran F. Suckling & Martin Taylor, Critical Habitat and Recovery, in THE 
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT AT THIRTY (Island Press 2006, Dale Goble, J. Michael Scott, 
and Frank W. Davis, eds.); see also Wyatt Golding, Could It Have Mattered? Assessing 
the Policy and Implementation of Critical Habitat Designation Through the Lens of 
Deepwater Horizon (2010) (for the LAW B565 U.S. Ocean and Coast Law advanced 
writing seminar, University of Washington School of Law). 
317. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(5)(A)(i). 
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species “or result in the destruction or adverse modification” of 
critical habitat.318 
Our firm’s brief conclusion is that BP’s oil has not yet 
entered “critical habitat” but that it is likely to do so in short 
order. Even were serious damage to be done, we do not believe 
that BP’s activity is constrained by the prohibition against 
“destruction or adverse modification.” Even if it were, we 
anticipate no circumstance that could rise to the hefty level of 
“destruction or adverse modification.” Mere oiling by BP is not 
the sort of annihilation these strict standards demand.319 
The “take” provisions of the ESA, making it unlawful to 
“kill,” “harm,” “capture” or “wound” any endangered species, 
present bigger concerns for BP.320 There is a civil penalty of 
“not more than $25,000 for each violation”321 and a 
misdemeanor criminal violation that can yield a fine of “not 
more than $50,000 or imprisonment for not more than one 
year, or both.”322 For BP’s purposes, this basically amounts to a 
body count—we do not want to hear that this sort of “take” is 
“only a misdemeanor” and “hard to prove.” In Exxon’s case, the 
United States surprised the company by picking up every 
carcass that could be found and throwing it in a freezer. The 
grand count for bird carcasses, as we recall, stopped 
somewhere around 135,000, though most were not endangered 
species.323 Based on the Exxon experience, our firm advises BP 
to assume that each and every federal worker is out collecting 
bodies and putting them into freezers. You might consider a 
company collection effort of your own—out of respect for the 
deceased. 
Though we cannot swear to the particulars, we invite BP to 
play the game of “body count.” We read the tales of many dead 
Kemp’s Ridley sea turtles,324 large numbers of Bluefin tuna 
larvae, “hideously oiled gulls and pelicans,”325 500 tarred-and-
                                                
318. Id. § 1536(a)(2). 
319. Butte Envtl. Council v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 607 F.3d 570, 583 (9th Cir. 
2010). 
320. See 16 U.S.C § 1532(19); see generally id. § 1538(a)(1)(B). 
321. Id. § 1540(a)(1). The “adjustments” upwards are ignored for the moment. 
322. Id. 
323. 2009 PERSONAL STORIES, supra note 9, at 121.  
324. See SAFINA, supra note 18, at 284–85 (describing that Kemp’s Ridley sea turtles 
were “hammered”). 
325. Id. at 104. 
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feathered birds, “350 dead or moribund loggerhead turtles,”326 
birds sodden in goo, a hundred dolphins in distress, the whole 
fauna of the sargassum weed “completely wiped out,”327 460 
dead or injured sea turtles, fins of larval fish encased in oil, 
one struggling dolphin, plankton seriously affected and eighty 
oiled but still living birds.328 Not to mention the 500 sea 
turtles, sixty dolphins and 2000 birds recovered dead.329 Each 
oiled carcass might mean “ten to one hundred undetected 
deaths.”330 
After we do the Body Counting, there remains only the 
math: 250 Bodies = 250 misdemeanors = 250 years in jail = 
$12,500,000; or 750 Bodies = 750 misdemeanors = 750 years in 
jail = $37,500,000. Environmentalists will argue that 250 
different BP officers should serve the 250 misdemeanors. The 
federal government will insist that any final settlement should 
reflect some figure for the lost pelicans and turtles. Our firm 
will demand that any amount assessed should be offset 
elsewhere in the ledger sheet—probably in the category of 
response costs. BP may offer a letter of contrition, perhaps a 
pledge of remorse, which should be more than enough to close 
the deal. 
Among the species discussed above, BP perhaps ought to be 
most concerned with the impact on Bluefin tuna. This is 
because the United States has displayed a disposition to fight 
for the Bluefin, and because the primary spawning grounds of 
the western population of Atlantic Bluefin tuna is in the Gulf 
of Mexico,331 with peak spawning season occurring between 
April and June.332 The Bluefin is loved and pursued around the 
world, and its numbers are plummeting. It is being severely 
negatively impacted by the Deepwater Horizon spill but 
fortunately for BP, it is not yet ESA-listed.333 
                                                
326. Id. at 151. 
327. Id. at 167. 
328. Id. at  98,124,157,167,172,190,193,284, 298–99. 
329. Id. at 222. 
330. See SAFINA, supra note 18, at 222. 
331. Steven L. H. Teo et al., Oceanographic preferences of Atlantic bluefin tuna, 
Thunnus thynnus, on their Gulf of Mexico breeding grounds, 152 MARINE BIOLOGY 
1105, 1106 (2007). 
332. Id. 
333. Petition to List the Atlantic Bluefin Tuna (Thunnus thynnus) as Endangered 
under the United States Endangered Species Act, CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY 2 
(May 24, 2010), available at 
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Nevertheless, there are compelling reasons to be concerned 
about the long-term impacts of the Deepwater Horizon on the 
tuna. Because spawning occurs at the surface, adults entering 
their spawning grounds were likely coated with oil. This 
potentially impairs locomotion and causes skin lesions.334 
Spawning is a metabolically-intensive time for tuna that 
increases the rate at which they need to pass oxygen over their 
gills. As such, “their gills are much more likely to capture tiny 
droplets of oil suspended in the water column, the result of 
dispersants used to break up the oil spill . . . .”335 Moreover, 
even individuals that did not enter the spill zone might eat 
contaminated prey.336 What we expect, ultimately, is that the 
United States’ serious concerns337 over the long term health 
over the Bluefin tuna population will carry over to the NRD 
process and we will see a United States “best effort” to secure 
restoration monies for the Bluefin tuna. 
We have many defenses to supposed liability for species loss 
in the Gulf. We will say that the damage happened “wholly 
before” the oil spill and it was due to other causes. But we 
recognize that the decline of the Bluefin tuna and other species 
needs a scapegoat and BP is a nominee. In this instance, 
perhaps, a strictly legal response may not be the best policy. 
We are exploring a variety of charitable opportunities that 
would allow BP to demonstrate conspicuous support for the 
species restoration without compromising its larger legal 
necessities.338 We will keep you posted and will seek your 
advice on these sensitive matters. 
                                                
http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/species/fish/Atlantic_bluefin_tuna/pdfs/BluefinTuna
Petition-5-24-2010.pdf. 
334. Fact Sheet: Spawning Bluefin Tuna & the Deepwater Horizon Spill, TAG-A-
GIANT FOUNDATION 2, www.tagagiant.org/media/GOMspill_factsheet.pdf (last visited 
Dec. 15, 2010). 
335. Mark Schleifstein, Bluefin tuna particularly vulnerable to Gulf of Mexico oil 
leak, NOLA.COM  (May 13, 2010), http://nola.com/news/gulf-oil-spill/index.ssf/2010/05/ 
bluefin_tuna_particularly_vuln.html. 
336. TAG-A-GIANT FOUNDATION, supra note 334, at 2. 
337. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Announcement of Tentative U.S. Negotiating 
Positions for Agenda Items and Species Proposals Submitted by Foreign Governments 
and the Cites Secretariat, FWS.GOV, 67–68, http://www.fws.gov/international/pdf/CoP 
15notice4-CLEAN WEB tentative U.S. positions_final.pdf (last visited Dec. 13, 2010). 
338. See, e.g., JOHN HOFMEISTER, WHY WE HATE THE OIL COMPANIES:  STRAIGHT 
TALK FROM AN ENERGY INSIDER (2010) (by the former President of Shell Oil Co.). 
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IV.  CONCLUSION 
BP’s liability for the largest spill in the history of the oil 
industry is significant and vast if any evidence shows corner 
cutting, measured safety risks and deviation from industry 
standards. If such evidence does exist, however, the industrial 
culture and systemic problems of managing risk within the 
government oversight system will divert some blame away 
from BP. In effect, we believe that many of the events leading 
up to the disaster are due to the company’s reliance on 
industry norms and failings of the larger system.339 Still, in 
some ways, BP  has been convicted in the eyes of the public 
and the public expects the government to hold BP financially 
accountable. If used strategically, the robust, post-Exxon 
Valdez landscape of environmental law is capable of punishing 
corporate environmental criminals through a complex formula 
of criminal and civil fines, civil penalties, response costs and 
natural resource damages. This formula represents a worst 
case, and is emblematic of an archaic, aggressive and punitive 
prosecution strategy against companies accused of 
environmental crimes. 
The government’s criminal enforcement choices and BP’s 
defensive moves will shape the future of liability for 
environmental crimes. As your counsel, we will use a collection 
of legal precedents and tactical advice to expand upon BP’s 
current defenses to erode environmental statutes and render 
some traditional tort law obsolete. We will help BP displace a 
potential DOJ criminal suit with a “deferred prosecution 
agreement” and vague promises to mitigate damages in the 
Gulf Coast through a private compensation scheme. 
In addition to criminal fines, civil penalties are likely to land 
at one billion dollars. This penalty estimate is merely a 
jumping-off point for government negotiations, and will be 
weighed against BP’s considerable success in minimizing and 
mitigating the effects of the discharge. BP undoubtedly has the 
upper hand in these negotiations as it is within the interest of 
the US government that harsh civil penalties take a backseat 
to the broader policies of economic progress and security. 
Determining civil damages will be a long, drawn-out and costly 
affair, but damages can be controlled by a favorable forum of 
                                                
339. See 2011 NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 9, at 217. 
75
Rodgers et al.: Stranger Than Fiction: An "Inside" Look at Environmental Liabilit
Published by UW Law Digital Commons, 2011
294 WASHINGTON J. OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY [Vol. 1:2 
 
BP’s choice. A portion of the estimated civil damages of thirty 
to forty billion dollars in liability should be dedicated to the 
creation of an “independent” compensation scheme that will 
sufficiently expedite and minimize claimants’ recovery. In the 
process, BP will successfully accomplish a wholesale 
transformation of US tort law and corrode common law 
protections that aid claimants in the right to recovery. 
In the 1990s’ post-Exxon Valdez legal system, Congress 
thrust responsible parties into a role of primary responsibility 
for the cleanup. Through our efforts, response costs will be 
kept within reason by a huge, disciplined, ambitious and well-
defined “takeover” of the critical leadership functions and 
human resource management. Taking ownership of the 
response puts BP in the driver’s seat; it provides access and 
influence over decision-making and information collection and 
it establishes critical relationships with the Gulf States and 
federal government. Success in the NRD phase relies on these 
relationships, as the NRD process is as much a negotiation as 
anything else. Success also requires anticipation and planning 
during the cleanup and careful “management” of the ongoing 
science. The science and economics that go into modern 
damage assessments are complex and full of surprises, 
especially in the area of contingent valuations. We must 
immediately make it clear to the trustees that these novel 
methodologies will not stand up in court. 
Successful use of legal precedents, tactical defenses and the 
creation of a novel compensation system  will  minimize BP’s 
accountability and damages for the Gulf Oil Spill, and in the 
process, undermine the liability scheme designed to punish 
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